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1. Overview
This synthesis paper brings together a range of studies conducted under the Conflict Research 
Programme (Somalia). The focus of the paper is on the political marketplace, which provides a lens 
to analyse the political economy of violence in turbulent societies, and to inform policy interventions. 
It is an alternative to approaches which focus narrowly on the role of economic ‘drivers of conflict’ 
as well as to explanations of conflict based on formal institutional dynamics. In this report, the 
term ‘political marketplace’ is conceived of as an open political system on the margins of global 
capitalism, in which political and economic conduct are under-determined by formal institutions and 
where cooperation and allegiance are instead exchanged via transactional politics, which includes 
both targeted violence and material incentives.
During the term of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo’, which began on 8 February 
2017 and was due to end on 8 February 2021, the country has had regional elections in each of 
its five member states. The ruling cabal in Mogadishu have attempted to install compliant leaders 
in each of these elections in order to enhance their chances of re-election in 2021, a centralizing 
turn within Somalia’s decentred political and security dispensation. In spite of a number of internal 
and external factors favouring this authoritarian direction – notably the support of key regional and 
Gulf State actors and an uncertain international community – this turn has had limited success, 
ultimately resulting in continual delays and re-negotiations around the conditions for the Presidential 
election itself. 
In interpreting the current political climate and direction, this paper identifies four key factors in 
Somalia’s political marketplace and political economy: (1) the competitive and decentralised nature 
of Somalia’s political market; (2) the salience of clan identity; (3) the pervasive use of money and 
violence; and (4) the unpredictable nature of the political marketplace due to its multiple levels. The 
ongoing impasse between the Federal Government (FGS) and Jubbaland, which sees Ethiopia and 
Kenya supporting opposing sides, the instrumentalization of identities being played out at local and 
national levels, and the use of money and violence in the 2019 elections, provides an exemplar of 
these different factors. 
While the political marketplace helps to explain the real politics taking place within the country, the 
contestation taking place around these regional and national election processes are symptomatic 
of what Bell and Pospisil term a ‘formalised political unsettlement’, an enduring condition that is 
marked by periods of violence, obstruction and (re-)negotiation but where an elite compact itself 
persists.1 In this condition, ‘no political position, no interest or no alliance is set in stone.’2 According 
to this depiction, in the case of Somalia, the outcome of the election and the conditions around that 
election are of limited significance and rather signs of its turbulence and unsettledness. The political 
marketplace dynamics are consistent with this characterisation. 
That said, a number of influencing factors or shocks are useful to consider, in analysing the more 
immediate political direction around the time of the expected Presidential election. The alliance 
of President Farmajo with PM Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afwerki has provided political 
and military support to the FGS and has played a crucial role in several of the regional elections. A 
concerted coercive effort by these regional allies might have played a decisive role in the elections. 
However recent events in Tigray, Ethiopia, alongside a new administration in (and associated 
messaging from) the United States, as well as the considerable popular resistance that would 
have been generated by such a move, suggest such an effort will not materialise. Kenya’s position, 
supporting Jubbaland President Ahmed Madobe in resisting the tripartite alliance of Ethiopia, Eritrea 
and the FGS, is a further notable factor in impeding this authoritarian trajectory.
A large injection of political finance by an external power may well influence the eventual choice 
of president, as has happened in the previous two presidential elections. However, with the recent 
1  Bell, Christine, and Jan Pospisil. 2017. “Navigating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political Unsettlement.” 
Journal of International Development 29: 576-593. 
2  Ibid, 6; de Waal, Alex. 2015. The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power. Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
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rapprochement between Saudi Arabia (and to a lesser extent the UAE) and Qatar, this factor is arguably 
less instrumental in exacerbating tensions and empowering opposition than might have been the 
case, although it still provides a source of political finance. While the use of cash is an established 
lubricant in the marketplace, for key positions (such as the presidency) the tactical use of cash 
intersects with a strong Somali anti-incumbency or rotation of power tendency. In consequence, the 
largest purse does not automatically decide the winner. 
The economic shock from Covid-19 is also playing out during the current period and has considerably 
reduced government revenue, political finance, and patronage from several sources, including trade-
related taxation, remittances, as well as aid-related rents and patronage. A number of prominent 
cases of corruption around Covid-19 assistance indicate that members of the elite have been facing 
difficulties in obtaining political finance. The effects of this reduction in finance and patronage 
are thought to be more detrimental to the opposition than to the incumbent president given the 
greater variety of resources available at the centre. Furthermore, from 2017 onward, international 
institutional engagement in Somalia has worked to increase the financial and fiscal strength of the 
FGS relative to other actors. 
Where Covid-19 has reduced the short-term political finance available to elites, political positioning 
around the elections is being influenced by the prospects of resources becoming available from the 
oil and gas sector. If this eventually materialises, it will have the capacity to reconfigure the structure 
of the political marketplace. However, this eventuality has not yet materialised. 
2. Introduction
This paper presents a synthesis of material developed under the CRP (Somalia) to reflect on elections 
in light of the underlying political economy and political marketplace within the country. It applies 
the political marketplace framework (PMF) and aims to inform policy thinking. Rather than being 
predictive, it tries to identify the facets of Somalia’s political system that will play a role in these 
elections – the broad question of interest to the paper is: what role do elections play in Somalia’s 
current political (un)settlement, why have they become crucially important, and who benefits from 
them being conducted in certain ways? The elections are important in themselves in that they signify 
at least some adherence to international norms, which serve to secure resources and the basis for 
unending negotiation. 
Somalia is an outward looking – or extraverted state – where business-political elites look to 
instrumentalise external sources of revenues/rents for domestic political and financial advantage.3 
This logic characterised Siad Barre’s government in its latter years and continues today in different 
forms. Somalia today retains considerable interest for a variety of foreign powers – neighbouring 
States, Gulf countries, Turkey and Western interests – where countering terrorism and migration, 
maritime competition, expanding trade and market opportunities and supporting humanitarian action 
inform and shape the financial and coercive political environment. These interests overlap but are 
also often distinct. The prospects of both oil/gas revenues and increased development assistance 
(following progress on debt relief) are further driving incentives and political dynamics domestically 
and internationally. 
In the case of Somalia, the PMF provides an alternative to analyses that focus on ‘clan’ as the main 
fracture and problem (in other words blaming clan dynamics for continued conflict and instability) 
or that assume that the country is progressing towards an institutional state. From a political 
marketplace perspective, four general characteristics of Somalia are evident: 
Somalia’s political market is highly competitive and decentralized. There are diverse sources of 
political finance that are not controlled by any single actor or group, as well as a multiplicity of 
3  Extraversion refers to the incorporation of elites into global power systems. This notion does not reduce African incorporation in 
the global political economy to purely greed and rapaciousness but is considered a tactic of survival and incorporation at the edges of 
the global capitalist system. Bayart, Jean-François, and Stephen Ellis. “Africa in the world: A history of extraversion.” African Affairs 99, 
no. 395 (2000): 217-267; Hagmann, Tobias. 2016. Stabilization, extraversion and political settlements in Somalia, Nairobi: Rift Valley 
Institute.
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individuals, groups and networks, characterized by often-shifting alliances. Similarly, no single actor 
or group has a monopoly on violence. Barriers to entry and exit for political players are relatively low, 
and it is not unusual to see new political-military entrepreneurs and opposition groups establish 
themselves alongside existing politicians and armed groups. 
It follows, that Somalia does not have anything approaching a coherent and unified security sector. 
Instead, this state of affairs is better characterized as a rivalrous ‘security arena’ made up of 
numerous smaller spaces for security actor contestation, as well as considerable security rents.4 In 
Somalia, both security and insecurity are produced by fragmented and diverse coalitions of actors 
and interests who cooperate and compete for resources and influence.5 
Clan identity remains salient in Somali politics but conflict in Somalia cannot be reduced simply to 
identity politics. In the PMF analysis, clan identity (in its various agglomerations) plays a historically 
and politically constituted role in structuring the organization of, and transactions in, the Somali 
political market. Clan-units were constituted in recent history for the purpose of claiming and 
holding state power at a particular point in time and dissolved into their constituent elements as 
circumstances changed. However, in peace efforts following state collapse, the clan unit was also 
formalized as the basis of political organization. In part, this was due to the legacy of civil war where 
kinship was used to organize violence as well as survival. On one hand, extremely violent episodes 
such as ‘clan-cleansing’ in Mogadishu and Hargeisa tended to make identities based on clan units 
more important.6 At the same time, lineage was used to organize information exchange, security, 
and material support as the structures of orderly governance collapsed.7 
Notwithstanding the historical constitution of clan-units, lineage plays a role in organizing everything 
from everyday urban life to mechanisms for attracting diaspora funding. Most crucially, perhaps, it 
continues to be used as a logic for organizing violence – both by political-military Somali entrepreneurs 
and neighbouring states alike. 
The pervasive use of violence and money are key tools that political entrepreneurs deploy to try to 
gain and achieve power. These tools are used as part of political market strategies – such as to 
influence elections – but do not always determine political outcomes. Like all markets, political 
markets are socially embedded, and subject to social norms and institutions (the ‘rules of the 
game’).8 Therefore, even though money is a pre-requisite to competing in elections, the largest purse 
holder is not guaranteed to win the election, and there is an implicit norm against incumbency and 
for the rotation of power. 
At the same time, actors also turn to violence in addition to, or as a substitute for cash. For example, 
violence – or the threat of violence – was used in several of the regional elections between 2018 and 
2020, in the SWS case to directly remove a competitive candidate by the FGS while in Jubbaland, to 
manipulate the election contest, keep the cost of loyalty down and resist the influence of the FGS.
The political market in Somalia has multiple levels and is very difficult to predict, where drivers 
of conflict and political instability operate at four levels – international, regional (transboundary), 
national, and local. Each of these levels is related to the others but also possesses a high degree of 
4  Hills, Alice. 2014. Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia, International Peacekeeping. 21(2): 165-180. DOI: 
10.1080/13533312.2014.910400
5  See section 5. (The use of the words ‘security’ and ‘security sector’ in Somalia reflects external assumptions around state authority 
being a prerequisite for individual and collective security. External interventions that draw clear distinctions between ‘state’ and ‘non-
state’ armed groups, ‘security providers’ and ‘causes of insecurity’, and ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ security actors are based on a flawed 
understanding of the actors and relationships in this arena).
6  See Kapteijns, Lidwien. 2013. Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; 
Hagmann, Tobias, Aditya Sarkar, Adan Aboker, Jamal Mohamed, Mahad Wasuge, Mohamed H. Ibrahim, Yassmin Mohamed and Mark 
Bradbury. 2018. Drivers, Governance and Political Economy of Urbanization in Somalia: Review and Research Gaps. Nairobi: Rift Valley 
Institute.  
7  Simons, Anna. 1995. Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone, Boulder CO: Westview.
8  North, Douglass. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W.W. Norton & Company; Leftwich, Adrian. 2015. 
“Thinking Politically: On the Politics of Politics.” in What is Politics? The Activity and its Study, edited by Adrian Leftwich, Malden: Polity 
Press.
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independent energy. This means that political changes at any one level affect others in unpredictable 
ways. For instance, the GCC crisis and regional rivalries in the Middle East play out differently in 
regional relationships in the Horn, and in Somali politics at different levels. The case of Jubbaland 
is most illustrative of these dynamics, where transnational/transborder ‘clan’ interests (of the 
Ogaden) were initially aligned with Ethiopian and Kenyan state interests, around the election of its 
first President, in 2015, but where those state interests later diverged, along with GCC rivalries which 
ultimately led to a discredited election and a still ongoing impasse.
Given these characteristics, it should be noted that the political marketplace is not the only logic at 
work in Somalia (or anywhere) – it is constrained by social norms and institutions. Among the most 
important of these institutions are socio-cultural practices of bloodmoney and bloodwealth payment 
(diya) based on lineage, the custom of contract among lineage groups (xeer), the framework of 
politicized identities, namely the clan unit system, which emerged from the organization of political 
violence and territorial control in the post-independence period, and the administration of justice which 
principally draws upon Islamic precepts and practices.  More specifically, this paper also identifies 
processes and norms that offer alternatives – or resistance – to this logic and its dynamics, referred 
to as ‘civicness’ within the CRP.9 These are illustrated through the 2017 Galkaio local agreement, in 
the justice and security domain in Kismayo town, as well as through the transnational activism of 
civic minded-individuals and networks. 
The focus of this paper is applied to the period from 2017 to 2020, under the centralising impulse of 
President Farmajo, and which provides a particular frame and iteration within which these broader 
characteristics have been redefined and have evolved. The regional elections that have taken place 
in this period are illustrative of the dynamics of the political marketplace and have influenced the 
conditions under which the federal election are being delayed and (re-)negotiated. This period has 
seen a radical shift in Ethiopia’s position towards Somalia, and its coercive assistance to the FGS 
(although currently unstable due to political tensions in Ethiopia), as well as Eritrean influence and 
the creation of the so-called Ethiopia-Eritrea-Somalia axis in the Horn of Africa. Kenya, supported by 
the UAE, continues to back Ahmed ‘Madobe’ in Jubbaland, where its maritime dispute with Somalia 
is an underlying factor, as well as concern with the above- mentioned axis. Adding to the external 
complexity has been the GCC crisis and its recent rapprochement, and that has been playing out in 
Somalia. 
The paper begins with a brief history of Somalia’s political system since 1969 using the PMF. This 
section reveals the historical constitution of the political market in Somalia, identifying critical 
junctures at which point the ‘rules of the game’ have shifted. For fifty years, Somalia’s history has 
been marked by multiple, overlapping crises. These crises have been caused by, and in turn, have 
driven far-reaching social, political and economic changes. Several ‘critical junctures’ are identified 
and explained in this political history. The current political dispensation and political marketplace 
around the Federal system is then introduced, followed by a discussion of the sources of finance that 
shape this marketplace. A discussion of the security arena, a critical element in the state-building 
enterprise, then takes place bringing insights from research conducted in Galkaio town at the border 
of Puntland and Galmudug. The role of clan, Islam and peace-making processes as norms and 
constraints in the violent and politicised Somali environment are then introduced, including with 
reference to the Galkaio local peace agreement. 
The penultimate section presents summaries of the elections in all Federal Member States, since 
2018, according to the PMF, revealing some of their particularities as well as relations to the centre 
under the Farmajo Presidency. In the final discussion, the analysis from these various themes is 
then brought to bear on the nature of the 2021 election controversy (the national Parliamentary and 
Presidential elections), not on the question of whether they are ‘free and fair’, but rather to pose the 
question of to what end do these elections serve? In so doing, this paper presents an alternative 
to two more dominant views, in academic and policy circles, which suggest that a) Somalia is 
progressing towards a ‘normal’ institutional state, or b) that clan is the main fracture and problem. 
9  For a brief discussion of civicness, see Kaldor, M. 2019. “The phenomenon of civicness and researching its advancement,” London 
School of Economics [Blog]. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2019/05/22/kaldor-civicness/.
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3. Emergence and Evolution of the Political Marketplace 
This section provides a brief history of the evolution of the political economy and political market 
in Somalia. It is schematically represented in Figure 1. For each period, three tools are utilized: (a) a 
summary of the political economy; (b) a brief description of what happened, using the PMF; and (c) 
a representation of politics in Somalia, using the three basic forms in which a political marketplace 
can be organized (a ‘centralized authoritarian kleptocracy’; an ‘oligopoly’ (either rivalrous or collusive) 
and a ‘free market’. 
Table 1: Somalia’s Political Economy and Political Marketplace 1969-2019
Period Economic Characteristics Political Finance Beneficiaries Regional Context




Land grabs, Cold 
War security rents
Politicians, soldiers 
and those allied 
to the regime, the 
military
Irredentist regime 
with desires to 
unify all Somali 
speaking regions 
in the Horn of 
Africa
















soldiers, and some 
elites closely 
associated with the 
regime  
Defeated in the 
Somalia-Ethiopia 
(Ogaden) war by 
Ethiopia 
1987 – 92 War economy Pillage, land 
grabs, smuggling, 
remittances
Clan-unit leaders Junior in the 
region










Warlords10 Junior, external 
intervention












as they set up 







Ethiopia, and a 
lesser extent, 
Kenya
10  Note that the term ‘warlord’ is a loose term and a symbiotic business-political relationship between different local and inter-
national actors often characterised this period. See Hagmann, Tobias, and Finn Stepputat. 2016. Corridors of trade and power: economy 
and state formation in Somali East Africa. DIIS Working Paper 8. http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/624676/DIIS_WP_2016_8.pdf. 
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Table 1 Continued: Somalia’s Political Economy and Political Marketplace 1969-2019














in positions of 
power in the TFG, 
businesspersons
Subordinate to 
Ethiopia, and to 
a lesser extent, 
Kenya












Ethiopia, and to 
a lesser extent, 
Kenya; Cockpit for 
GCC rivalry; 
Theater of US 
counter-terrorism 
action
Figure 1: Evolution of the Political Marketplace in South-Central Somalia
Independence and Siyad Barre’s Ascent to Power (1969-1977)
The former Italian territory of Somalia and the British territory of Somaliland achieved independence 
in June – July 1960. After a brief period of multi-party politics, Siyad Barre came to power in 
1969 in a military coup and immediately began to coup-proof his regime, dismissing or executing 
military colleagues and his co-conspirators from the coup. After consolidating his power, Barre 
launched a modernizing state-building project expanding the Somali army, developing a centralized 
command economy, building infrastructure11, and seeking to create a nationalist Somali identity (in 
party by outlawing ‘tribalism’12). Barre also leveraged Soviet support and equipment to develop a 
disproportionately large and well-equipped army for a small country. During this period, Somalia 
appeared set on the path of state-building, that is, it appeared to be moving towards ‘modern 
statehood’. 
11  Hagmann et al. 2018. 
12  Tribalism, or the instrumentalization of clan, was officially banned in 1971, and made a criminal office, with the payment of diya 
or blood money therefore outlawed. In reality, customary norms continued. See Lewis, 1989. “The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali 
Segmentary Nationalism,” African Affairs 88 (353): 573.
10        Somalia’s Politics: The Usual Business?
At this point, Somalia could be classified as a limited authoritarian kleptocracy based on patronage. 
It was limited because the reach of the centralized state was still relatively limited, even if it was 
expanding, and governance was not being conducted on the basis of formal political institutions. 
This is not to suggest that government action was insignificant – merely that its impact was uneven. 
While Barre’s regime was initially greeted with public support,13 his ability to control the political 
market through patronage decreased with the creation of the franco valuta (fv) system and the rise 
in remittances. These evolutions fuelled the rise of new actors—a trader class—and the growth of an 
informal private sector which was both outside of government control and was greater in magnitude 
than the political budget Barre could extract from the government. While Barre did target rivals in 
attempts to consolidate his control, this period featured relatively low levels of political violence. All 
of this changed after the war in the Ogaden with Ethiopia. 
Level of analysis Account
Political economy A centralized but small formal economy dominated by parastatals 
and nationalized companies, overshadowed by a much larger informal 
economy. The Siyad Barre regime used the expropriation and allocation 
of land and water rights in the southern riverine regions as tools for 
building political support at the national level. While the Barre regime 
sought to lead a centralized command economy, the creation of 
the franco valuta (fv) system and the rise of remittances created (a) 
links between private traders, migrant labour and their families, and 
the import demand of private businesses, and spurred the growth of 
a trader class, which later became the money transfer companies. 
Second, the official economy and government reserves were quickly 
overshadowed by the size of the private sector and the diffuse 
financing through informal channels outside of government control. 
Structure of political 
firms and strategies
A single, centralized political system organized in a bureaucratic 
and hierarchical form, with the army as the symbol and model of the 
nation and state. While Barre did target individuals as he sought to 
consolidate power, this period featured relatively low levels of political 
violence. 
Organization of the 
marketplace
No political marketplace existed – but the economic characteristics 
which shaped the political market were being put in place during this 
period.  
13  Menkhaus, Ken. 2014b. “Calm between the storms? Patterns of political violence in Somalia, 1950 – 1980.” Journal of East African 
Studies 8 (4): 558-572.
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Ogaden War and After: Emergence of the Political Marketplace (1977-1987)
Figure 2: Creation of the political market as a tactic of regime survival (1977-87)
Following the failed invasion of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, Barre’s regime faced immense 
criticism for its embarrassing defeat. In April 1978, there was an unsuccessful coup against him. 
As Barre became increasingly desperate to maintain power, he adopted new strategies giving rise to 
political marketplace dynamics. These strategies included Barre’s diversion of U.S. aid to his political 
budgets, the neutralization and fracturing of the army, and the instrumentalization of clan identity 
to drive local conflict. By 1987, the political marketplace had fully emerged in Somalia and began to 
establish the clan unit as the basic unit of political organization. 
Against an informal economy that Barre could neither capture nor block, Barre became reliant on U.S. 
aid to prop up his regime. Alongside foreign military assistance, funds came from concessionary 
loans, development assistance, food aid, and humanitarian aid for refugees. Much of it was diverted 
or stolen; some of it was used to feed the army and militias. The once-professional security services 
became predatory, advancing the interests of empowered clans, including through land grabs, 
depriving thousands of farmers (many from disadvantaged clans) of their land and livelihoods.14
In addition, through purges of the officer corps and a reorganization of the army as a coalition of clan-
unit-based militias, Barre sought to dismantle the army and neutralize it as a threat to his regime. 
Coupled with divide-and-rule tactics, Barre exploited local rivalries and tried to tie up commanders 
in never-ending local rivalries so that they would not be a threat to his regime. In addition, Barre re-
politicized, re-purposed, and intensified lineage competition (which had always existed in Somalia) 
to ensure his own political survival. 
During this period, the state was intervening to fuel and instrumentalize inter-clan conflict, not to 
prevent it, as a strategy for Barre to maintain power.15 By 1987, Barre’s use of violence (either directly, 
or through proxy militia) had helped to establish the clan unit as the political-military unit through 
which territory and power would be contested. 
14  Menkhaus 2014b; Menkhaus, Ken. 2007. “The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts.” African Affairs 106: 357-390; de Waal 2015, 
110-115; and Sarkar, Aditya. “‘Evolving’ Federalism and the Security Arena in Somalia: Implications for the Political Marketplace.” Back-
ground paper for a workshop on the political marketplace, Martin School, Oxford University, 30-31 May 2018. Mimeo. 
15  Compagnon, Daniel. 2013. “State-sponsored violence and conflict under Mahamed Siyad Barre: the emergence of path de-
pendent patterns of violence.” Reinventing Peace, The World Peace Foundation Blog, October 22. http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventing-
peace/2013/10/22/state-sponsored-violence-and-conflict-under-mahamed-siyad-barre-the-emergence-of-path-dependent-patterns-of-
violence/.
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Level of analysis Account
Political economy A kleptocratic system with officially sanctioned and extremely high 
levels of corruption. The state was financed by the diversion of 
humanitarian aid and proceeds from development assistance and 
military assistance. The increased importance of merchant capital 
(especially in the diaspora) provided political financing for the 
emerging opposition. 
Structure of political 
firms and strategies
Proliferation of smaller political-military actors mobilized by the state 
and emerging in opposition to it. The emerging opposition mobilized 
primarily (but not solely) on the basis of clan-identity, with some 
nationalist ambitions.  
Organization of the 
marketplace
A segmented marketplace emerged – the beginnings of a competitive 
and rivalrous security arena with multiple actors and fluid alliances. 
The state remained a kleptocracy but was no longer as centralized.   
 
Civil War and State Collapse (1987-1992); Interregnum
Figure 3: Civil war and temporary market consolidation (1987-91)
Encompassing the Somali civil war, the overthrow of Siyad Barre, and state collapse, this period was 
characterized by the emergence of multiple military actors based on clan units and a lowering of 
barriers to entry into the political marketplace. As previously described, this was not pre-ordained, 
but the result of (a) specific competition within and between opposition groups; (b) the counter-
insurgency campaign, and (c) external pressures from foreign sponsors (primarily Ethiopia). This 
period also marks the move towards free competition and the firm establishment of a multi-level, 
rivalrous marketplace. 
In 1990, an uprising began against Siyad Barre in Mogadishu – this culminated at the end of the 
year with the SPM and USC forces surrounding the city. Siyad Barre fled the city on 27 January 
1991, having looted the central bank. At this time, the remnants of Siyad Barre’s forces formed the 
Somali National Front (SNF). The ease with which a former government reassembled itself as a clan 
unit armed faction reveals that the regime had previously abandoned any pretence of serving as a 
national government. 
This was a period characterized by an extraordinary fluidity in terms of armed actors. The clan units 
formed for the takeover of the state rapidly realized that they would be unable to do so and sought to 
form larger, more opportunistic alliances. Mohamed Farah Aideed constructed the Somali National 
Alliance, cobbling together elements from existing opposition groups, notably the SPM. His rival, Ali 
13        Somalia’s Politics: The Usual Business?
Mahdi, constructed the Somali Salvation Alliance, which also ostensibly spanned different clans. 
The logic for this was simple - clan mobilization, by itself, was not sufficient to gain political power, 
and canny Somali political-military entrepreneurs sought to build opportunistic alliances which 
would better be able to serve their political and material interests. These alliances (even if they only 
existed on paper) did not last long; given the extraordinarily diffused sources of political finance, as 
well as the personal ambitions of the political entrepreneurs they split into various lineage-based 
sub-groupings. The clan unit was a product of a particular time and place, but even as it splintered it 
defined the form of future political competition in Somalia.
Level of analysis Account
Political economy War, plunder of state assets. 
Structure of political 
firms and strategies
Extraordinary fluidity of armed actors. An initial period of consolidation 
(into clan-unit based armed groups) which rapidly disintegrated into 
smaller units, which began to compete with one another.  
Organization of the 
marketplace
For a brief period, Somalia resembled a rivalrous oligopoly with a few 
large groups united by the sole desire to overthrow the regime. This 
soon degenerated into localized and free competition between the 
splintering armed groups.    
Market Fragmentation & External (UN) Interventions (1992-1998)
Figure 4: Market fragmentation (1992-1998)
The UN interventions in Somalia (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II, punctuated by the U.S. Operation Restore 
Hope – 1992-1995) had two primary impacts on the incentives and players in the political market: 
(a) they helped resurrect the rapidly fading possibility that external rents could be accessed through 
a centralized state; and (b) contracts handed out during UNOSOM I and II helped some prominent 
businesspersons make their first fortunes. ‘[O]pportunistic businesspeople won multimillion-dollar 
contracts for transportation and handling of donated food aid, much of which was illicitly siphoned 
off and sold on the black market’.16 Those businesses that had the strongest ties to warlords17 were 
best positioned to loot the international aid agencies. Because warlords controlled security on the 
roads, contractors that had relationships with warlords were able to demonstrate that they could get 
aid into the otherwise inaccessible countryside for a price. This proved to be an invaluable source of 
16  Ahmad, Aisha. 2017. Jihad & Co., Oxford University Press, 105. See also Ahmad, Aisha. 2015. “The security bazaar: business inter-
ests and Islamist power in civil war Somalia.” International Security 39(3): 89-117. 
17  The expression ‘warlord’ is a particularly complex one; it is generally understood to mean politico-elites who led clan-units in the 
1990s – they are associated with the looting of private properties, operating protection rackets, and checkpoints, and provision of secu-
rity. In practice, warlords ranged from those who had some political constituencies to those who were simply defecting military leaders 
with no political background. Hagmann 2016, 30; Marchal, Roland. 2007a. “Warlordism and Terrorism: How to Obscure an Already 
Confusing Crisis? The Case of Somalia.” International Affairs 83(6): 1091-1106.
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political finance for the warlords in an otherwise constrained political market. Using similar tactics 
Aideed is reported to have set up a number of fake NGOs to try and siphon off aid contracts. What 
this suggests, is that there were few other accessible sources of political finance available to most 
political-military entrepreneurs at this time.
After the withdrawal of the UN mission, regional actors began to play much more significant roles 
in Somalia, including in mediating the direction of peace processes. At the same time, a number 
of locally-driven peace agreements prevented a return to the worst of the fighting. An alternate 
explanation, however, is that there simply weren’t enough resources left to fight over. Even as 
Somalis sought to restore some semblance of order through the establishment of businesses, 
starting schools, etc., the sources of money available for leaders’ political budgets were meagre. In 
an apocryphal story, when some clan leaders came to complain to Aideed about a local dispute, he 
was so cash strapped that he offered to give them ammunition which they could sell in the market 
and obtain money to settle their disputes. 
Level of analysis Account
Political economy War economy – initially characterized by efforts to capture what 
remained of the state, and then by waves of land grabs, looting, and 
diversion of humanitarian aid. 
Structure of political 
firms and strategies
An initial period of consolidation (into clan-unit based armed groups) 
which rapidly disintegrated into smaller units, which began to compete 
with one another.  
Organization of the 
marketplace
For a brief period, Somalia resembled a rivalrous oligopoly with a few 
large groups united by the sole desire to overthrow the regime. This 
soon degenerated into localized and free competition between the 
splintering armed groups.    
Efforts to Re-centralise the Market (1998-2004)
Figure 5: Externally sanctioned market structure (1998-2004)
The period between 1998 and 2004 was notable for a number of peacemaking efforts, many of which 
were facilitated by neighbouring countries as a way of gaining an upper hand in regional geopolitical 
rivalries. The critical juncture at the beginning of the period consisted of two events. The first was the 
emergence of the ‘4.5 formula’ (for fixed proportional representation by clan family unit) at the Sodere 
conference, and which has since been employed at subsequent Somali reconciliation conferences. 
Second, and perhaps more important, was the formation of Puntland in 1998 (with Abdullahi Yusuf, 
formerly of the SSDF, as President), which gave credence to a decentralized clan-unit based federal 
model for reaching a political settlement in Somalia; this came to be called the ‘building blocks’ 
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approach.18 Together, the 4.5 formula and the ‘building blocks’ approach remain the basis on which 
the political arena in Somalia remains structured today. In essence, however, these peace processes 
continued to conceptualize peace in Somalia as a centralized governmental structure acting as 
a conduit for external rents – security assistance, development, and humanitarian funding, etc. It 
would also not be fair to characterize all of these peace agreements as purely externally driven: they 
also incorporated demands from Somali interlocutors. From a political marketplace perspective, a 
model of market regulation was put in place during this period, which was out of sync with the actual 
operation of the political market. 
This period also saw the consolidation of the independent business class. In the early 1990s, the 
export of primary goods such as livestock, bananas, and charcoal grew significantly. In return, 
businesspeople imported consumer goods, including textiles, sugar, and cigarettes but also khat 
and weapons. With the de-escalation of open conflict in the mid-1990s, major financial companies 
from other regions started to invest or reinvest in Mogadishu, collaborating with warlords to ensure 
the protection of their property.19 Between the middle and the end of the 1990s, many businesses 
re-established themselves in Mogadishu, changing from single-clan ownership models to multi-clan 
shareholding structures.20 This period saw the establishment of more advanced industries, including 
the spread of telecommunication companies and the opening of small factories. Telecommunications 
companies were particularly important as the hawala system allowed diaspora to bypass centralized 
mechanisms and send resources directly to their kin, and where these key financial institutions were 
based offshore, giving them autonomy. 
Over time, Somali business owners separated themselves from the clan unit politicians and warlords 
who had dominated the political and security arena in the early 1990s. While at first businesspeople 
financed armed factions in return for protection, they began to fund their own security forces and, 
later on, turned to local Shari’a courts for protection. This allowed them to reduce security expenses, 
which had diminished profitability. By 1999, the ‘business class had become an independent political 
force’ as leading businesspeople stopped paying protection money, turning instead to Islamic courts 
or hiring their own private security.21 These businesspersons were to become among the more 
significant sources of political finance over the next few years. 
Level of analysis Account
Political economy Emergence of a new business class, which became a major source 
of political finance for political actors – beginning with the TNG. 
Armed groups tried to establish their control over pockets of territory 
with a view to raising finances. Charitable donations and diaspora 
remittances remained significant. 
Structure of political 
firms and strategies
A fictitious political structure was overlaid onto a highly rivalrous 
security arena. Islamic Courts, which utilized the logic of political 
Islam as the logic of market organization, while also remaining part of 
the political market, became more prominent. 
Organization of the 
marketplace
A segmented political market reemerged. This consists of a political 
level with an externally sanctioned structure to mediate competition 
between the political actors, while on the ground, a large number of 
armed groups continued to exist. 
The ICU moment, the Ethiopian invasion and its aftermath (2005-2011) 
From 2005 to 2011, the political marketplace was reshaped first by the ICU and then secondly by the 
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in support of the TFG. The ICU’s rise to power, backed by businessmen 
who were better able to operate under the ICU, peaked in 2005-2006 when the ICU established (or 
tried to establish) a state on loosely Islamic lines in Mogadishu. This was the first time domestic 
18  Bryden, Matt. 1999. “New Hope for Somalia? The Building Block Approach.” Review of African Political Economy 26 (79): 134-140.
19  Marchal, Roland. 2002. A Survey of Mogadishu’s Economy, Nairobi: European Commission Somalia Unit.
20  Hagmann and Stepputat 2016, 19. 
21  Menkhaus 2007; Crisis Group. 2011. Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support, Africa Report N°170, 21 February, Brus-
sels: International Crisis Group.
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Somali political finance aligned behind a single group or conglomerate in the hopes of regulating/
dismantling the political marketplace. The ICU, however, engaged both in the logic of the political 
marketplace using violence and cash, and at times also acted against its logic by acting against 
popular sentiment and against its business sponsors. Eventually, the ICU’s rule sparked external 
military intervention by Ethiopia. 
Figure 6: The ‘Islamic Courts’ moment (2005-06)
In 2006, on the back of a sustained diplomatic campaign – Ethiopia invaded Somalia and routed 
the ICU forces. The Ethiopian invasion was driven by its support of the TFG, but more importantly, 
by its desire to neutralize suspected Eritrean influence within the ICU. This fundamentally re-
shaped the political market once again, restoring the segmented market structure between an 
oligopolistic political arena and a competitive security arena. The Ethiopian invasion installed the 
TFG in Mogadishu; it did not change the rules of the market but did change the way the market was 
organized. To survive, the TFG needed to be propped up, and the African Union Peace Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) filled this role. AMISOM was mandated by the African Union Peace and Security 
Council in 2007 and then endorsed by the UN Security Council in 2009.22 The other major actor in the 
security arena, Al-Shabaab, or to use its full name, Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen emerged out of 
the ruins of the ICU and various older Islamist groups.23 Within the political marketplace, it is a major 
player which operates within the framework of the political market, while also deploying alternate 
logics to try and re-organize the market – including strands of nationalism (against foreigners – 
Kenyans, Ethiopians, the UN, etc), as well as political Islam.
22  Williams, Paul. 2013. “The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges.” Stability: International Journal of 
Security and Development 2(2): 1-17.
23  Marchal, Roland. 2007b. “A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3(3): 
381-404; Marchal, Roland. 2011. “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujaheddin.” http://www.
sciencespo.fr/ceri/en/content/rise-jihadi-movement-country-war-harakat-al-shabaab-al-mujaheddin-somalia.  
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Figure 7: Reversal and return of market segmentation after the Ethiopian invasion (2006-11)
Level of analysis Account
Political economy Major sections of the business class coalesced behind the ICU in 
2005-06. With relatively well-aligned sources of political finance, 
the ICU was able to regulate the political market for a short period 
before the dislocation of the Ethiopian invasion. Businesspersons 
derived their funds from the telecoms sector, UN Contracts, diversion 
of humanitarian aid, as well as proceeds from piracy (anti-piracy 
consultancy). Turkey and the Gulf States (primarily UAE and Qatar, but 
to some extent the Saudis) began to emerge as players in the political 
market, entering through the humanitarian efforts in the aftermath of 
the famine. 
Structure of political 
firms and strategies
A fictitious political structure was overlaid onto a highly rivalrous 
security arena. Islamic Courts, which utilized the logic of political Islam 
as the logic of market organization, while also remaining part of the 
political market became more prominent. AMISOM and Al-Shabaab – 
both superior military organizations which operate within and outside 
the political market emerged at this time. 
Organization of the 
marketplace
A period of market consolidation (under the ICU) – during which the 
security arena and the political arena began to overlap substantially. 
The segmented marketplace returned after the Ethiopian invasion – 
characterized by an oligopolistic political arena overlaid on a rivalrous 
security arena. Market organization was closely linked to the strategies 
of the neighbouring countries. 
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The Federal Project and Efforts to Re-work Market Regulation (2012-Present)
Level of analysis Account
Political economy Since 2010-2011, new sources of political finance have emerged 
in the form of external rents from Turkey, UAE, and Qatar, and Gulf 
rivalries have spilled over and been exploited by actors in the Somali 
marketplace. Security rents are considerable. The business community 
continued to be a key source of rents, and investments from the 
diaspora began to return during this period.  
Structure of political 
firms and strategies
The configuration of actors during this period has repeatedly shifted 
based on context. In many ways, the everyday business of politics 
and governance is messier than earlier periods with a large number 
of actors, including clan elders, armed militia, businesspersons, and 
foreign actors and constantly negotiated alliances. 
Organization of the 
marketplace
The federal structure was re-established cementing the multi-level 
nature of the marketplace with the FMSs as subordinate to the FGS. 
Overall, the political market consists of a rivalrous oligopoly overlaid 
onto a free market. The security arena, while linked to the political 
arena, functions as a competitive free market with numerous actors. 
 
From 2012 to the present, one of the dominant shifts in the Somali political market has been the 
attempt by domestic and international actors to re-establish the federal system and restructure 
competition for power within that framework. Non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab, as well as 
foreign actors, such as Ethiopia and Qatar, played key roles in both attempts to re-establish the 
federal system as well as influencing the dynamics of it; at times aligning with or against key actors 
vying for power. This further entrenched the multi-level nature of the marketplace fuelled by external 
rents and demarcated and interrelated arenas of contestation. 
As an internationally driven political project, the Somali federal system has been described as 
‘principally a division of spoils that is held together by a combination of a common threat posed 
by Al-Shabaab, copious levels of security driven external aid, and protection afforded by AMISOM 
peacekeepers.’24 Similarly, de Waal has described it as ‘a donor-security cartel to minimize regional 
and international patronage competition, with an African coalition to enforce this oligopoly, with UN 
sanctions imposed on violators. The federal system is designed to distribute rents broadly enough – 
and reduce Mogadishu’s role – to buy in everyone except those designated as terrorists or pirates’.25 
In political market terms, the federal formula establishes the basic regulatory structure for the market 
as an oligopoly, with the FGS as the superior actor and the FMS’s as subordinate actors.
The federal formula has shaped elite political competition around access to external rents in Somalia. 
On the other hand, the everyday business of politics and governance continues to be far messier, and 
involves a large number of actors, including clan elders, armed militia, businesspersons and foreign 
actors, with the precise configuration of actors’ dependent on context. The security arena remains 
closely linked to the political arena but is organized as a competitive free market with many actors. 
Since 2010-11, new sources of political finance have appeared in the form of external rents from 
Turkey, UAE, and Qatar, and Gulf rivalries have spilled over into, and been exploited by actors in the 
Somali marketplace. In short, the political market consists of a rivalrous oligopoly overlaid onto a 
free market. 
Given this structure, Al-Shabaab’s position and evolution vis-à-vis the federal arrangement is both 
fundamental as well as contradictory. The group has remained a major actor throughout the period 
of the Federal project and has rejected attempts at negotiated settlements. It has however made its 
own elite bargain with political actors, and is increasingly viewed as a mafia protection racket26, but 
24  Menkhaus, K. 2018. Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Somalia Case Study, Nairobi: Somalia Stability Fund, 23. 
25  de Waal 2015.
26  Menkhaus 2018, 4.
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also one that finds significant support as a result of its justice capacity and the limited benefits and 
high levels of corruption evident in the oligopolistic federal arrangement.27 In addition, Al-Shabaab 
has developed its own bureaucratic ability and extended its taxation capacity – directly or indirectly 
– into virtually all areas of the economy.28 Similarly, the groups’ justice capacity, where it is seen 
as relatively fair, efficient and with the ability to enforce its decisions, reaches outside its territorial 
presence and undermines the Government’s extremely weak justice system.29 Al-Shabaab can 
therefore be postulated as both colluding with and competitive to this federal oligopoly, the exact 
position of which varies according to context. 
The Presidency of Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud (2012-17) saw some tangible progress towards the 
creation of a federal system, with the formation of several of the FMSs.30 The 2012 Parliamentary 
and Presidential elections that brought Hassan Sheikh to power enjoyed little legitimacy. They were 
rushed, challenged, and criticised as a corrupt and vote-buying process.31 The price of votes, through 
the electoral college system (rather than by popular franchise) ranged from $5,000 to $30,00032, 
with politics at the local and national level recognised to have become increasingly monetised over 
time.33 Hassan Sheikh was elected as President, backed by Qatari interests as well as business and 
political allies in Mogadishu. The various processes and elections to put together the leadership of 
the federal member states were also associated with high levels of corruption and/or intimidation. 
Hassan Sheikh’s Presidency disappointed many as pervasive corruption continued, with the 
emerging state disproportionately attracting resources to Mogadishu where the cost of patronage 
therefore increased. The highest political offices benefited from Mogadishu’s booming economy: 
real estate, services, private contracts.34 International recognition had led to increased foreign aid 
as well as the further return of diaspora actors and their investment. In addition to remittances, aid 
and trade, mobile money, construction (property), and cash crops have been added to the list of 
lucrative business opportunities, which continue to be controlled by a powerful but expanding elite. 
Like Sheikh Sharif before him, Hassan Sheikh had many of his own business interests, including aid 
contracts, oil exploration and storage, port construction and operations.35 
The Federal Member States were all formed under Hassan Sheikh’s Presidency in the period 2014-
2015. Only Puntland pre-dated the Federal system, and thereby joined as a consolidated polity, 
following reconciliation processes in the mid to late 1990s, and having established an internal power-
sharing arrangement with accepted rules and norms.36 The exact dynamics behind the formation of 
the remaining FMSs, and the extent to which the federal framework has become a political reality, 
still remains the subject of debate. One line of argument suggests that these political processes 
and state formation projects are ‘de-centralized approaches for managing a larger group of elite 
interests’, and not driven by popular demand.37 Others contend that the formation of the FMSs points 
27  See Hoehne/CRP, 2020, forthcoming, who also argues that an increasing Islamic conservatism has developed within Somali socie-
ty, in part as a result of the failures of alternative systems. 
28  Al-Shabaab’s coercive capacity and use of telecommunications technologies, mean that businesses and individuals are easily 
reached by the group in order to organise tax payments and summon individuals to court.
29  Joakim Gundel, Louis Alexandre Berg, and Yahya Ibrahim. 2016. Political Economy of Justice in Somalia. Working Paper, World 
Bank, Justice, Security and Development Series;  HIPS. 2020. Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System: fixing the politics, policies 
and procedures. Heritage Institute.
30 Puntland was the only pre-existing polity. The international plan for managing the Somali political market was re-worked at the Lon-
don Conference of 2012 but using the same units of analysis as before – clan units and the creation of a federal administration based 
on those.
31  Menkhaus 2018, 22
32  Hofmann, Anette, Claire Elder, Jos Meester, and Willem van den Berg. 2017. Somalia’s business elites – Political power and econom-
ic stakes across the Somali territories and in four key economic sectors, The Hague: Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. 17 February, 53.
33  SaferWorld. 2020. Clans, Consensus, and Contention: Federalism and Inclusion in Galmudug, Saferworld.
34  Hoffman el al. 2017, 53.
35  Hoffman et al., 2017, 39-40.
36  Somaliland is notionally considered one of the 6 FMSs but in practical terms is not part of the federal arrangement and interacts 
with the FGS as a separate state. See PDRC. 2008. “The Puntland Experience: A Bottom-up Approach to Peace and State Building.” The 
Search for Peace: Somalia Program, in collaboration with Interpeace. https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/2008_
SomP_PDRC_Interpeace_A_Bottom_Up_Approach_To_Peace_And_Statebuilding_EN.pdf
37  Mosley, Jason. 2015. Somalia’s Federal Future: Layered Agendas, Risks and Opportunities. Research Paper, London: Chatham 
House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/somalias-federal-future-layered-agendas-risks-and-opportunities, 17. 
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to the increased salience of territorially bounded political identity within the Somali polity. In other 
words, demands for the formation of the FMSs emerged from a desire for political structures which 
control (more or less) clearly demarcated territory, as well as people and resources within it.38 In 
reality, no single narrative fully explains the formation of all the FMSs – each has been formed 
through a distinct political process, often involving regional actors in addition to Somali politicians.
For example, Jubaland was initially conceived in 2010 by Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (aka Professor 
Gandhi), the ex-Defence Minister of Somalia, as a pan-Ogaden political project (initially named 
Azania).39 Kenyan involvement and suspected commercial interests were part of this project. In 
addition, Ethiopia has a special interest in this area of Somalia given its own Ogaden population 
and the insurgent group, the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front). An alignment of Kenyan, 
Ethiopian and transnational/transborder Ogaden interests eventually saw Jubbaland formed and 
Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’ (s)elected as interim and first president.40 The FGS at the time 
opposed Madobe as Jubbaland’s leader.41 The FGS did play an active and successful role in the 
formation of the interim Galmudug administration (which took place after progress had already been 
made on the Jubbaland and South West State), with the Damul Jadid political association close 
to President HSM investing heavily – financially and politically – in the appointment of the first 
President, Abdikarim Hussein Guled.42 Galmudug remains a constitutional anomaly as it consists of 
one and a half regions where each FMS is constitutionally required to comprise of at least 2 regions.43 
Considering Puntland pre-dated the Federal system altogether, the FMSs comprise a heterogenous 
set of polities with varied influences behind their emergence. 
Each FMS reflects a power-sharing arrangement among its respective politically and militarily 
dominant clan units. This is the logical product of the intersection of the ‘4.5’ formula and the 
territorial settlement, in which the boundaries of each FMS contain majority and minority clan units. 
The clan unit designation varies according to context and structures political competition and 
hence the political market. The interests of the various elites are appeased by the division of key 
positions and the state capital between representatives of the dominant clan units. The president, 
vice-president, and speaker of parliament positions attract the most interest. These locations and 
positions in turn reflect access to resources and rents. However, the allocation of parliamentary 
seats reflects, at least notionally, a more inclusive incorporation of the different identity groups in 
each state (though not in proportion to their populations). Political contestation at the parliamentary 
level (for federal and regional elections) is highly contested and takes place at the sub-clan/lineage 
level.44 The first parliamentary elections in each FMS were associated with widespread allegations 
of vote-buying and bribery and, in some cases, violence and intimidation, where in some cases the 
legitimacy of representative elders was questioned.45 
The 2017 Federal election was again contested with significant amounts of cash, and Farmajo’s 
win surprised most observers. His election confirmed the Somali predilection – a norm of Somali 
politics – against incumbency, and against his predecessor’s exclusionary practices.46 As a member 
of the Marehan clan, he was also the first President under the Federal system to not come from the 
Hawiye clan family, who dominate Mogadishu, and were expected to keep the President’s position. 
38  Hoehne, Markus. 2016. “The rupture of territoriality and the diminishing relevance of cross‐cutting ties in Somalia after 1990.” De-
velopment and Change 47(6): 1379-1411, 1385. 
39  Crisis Group. 2012. The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, Africa Report N°184, 15 February. Brussels: International Crisis 
Group.
40  See: Nisar, Majid and Khalif Abdiraham, 2021. “The Jubbaland Project and the Transborder Ogadeen: Identity Politics and Regional 
Reconfigurations in the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia Borderlands.” Conflict Research Programme Research Memo, London School of Eco-
nomics. https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Conflict-Research-Programme/crp-memos/jubbaland-project-transborder-og-
adeen.pdf; Majid, Nisar and Khalif Abdirdahman. 2019. “Jubaland – Post-Election Overview.” Research memo. Mimeo; Berhane, Daniel. 
2011. “Azania: The True Objective of Kenya in Somalia.” Horn Affairs.  https://hornaffairs.com/2011/11/24/azania-the-true-objective-of-
kenya-in-somalia/. 
41  This included allying with other militia and tacitly, with Al-Shabaab, in addition to using financial payments to stop Sheikh Ahmed 
Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’ from forging ahead with its formation. See UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea (UNMG). 2013. “Re-
port of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia.” S/2013/413.
42  UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea. 2015. “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia.” S/2015/801, 52.
43  For a discussion of Galmudug’s political evolution see Saferworld 2020.
44  These dynamics have not been well researched to date.
45  Various personal communications. 
46  Hofmann et al. 2017.  
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The appointment of Hassan Khaire as PM reflected the ever-shifting alliances that characterise 
Somalia’s political marketplace as Khaire was firmly in Hassan Sheikh’s camp for much of the 
election campaign; The core ruling cabal – which came to be known as the ‘FFK’ – was completed 
by Fahad Yasin, appointed as head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA); Yasin 
was also able to bring Qatari money to Farmajo’s camp, which was previously enabled by Farah 
Abdulqadir during the previous Presidency.47  
From 2018 to 2020, elections were held across the FMSs that epitomized the defining features of the 
Somali political market—multi-level, salience of clan identity, pervasive use of violence and money, 
and its highly competitive and decentralized nature—and how these dynamics have varied depending 
on context. These demonstrate both the potential and limits of President Farmajo’s attempt to 
centralize power and reveal underlying dynamics in the political economy and political marketplace 
due in part to Somalia’s federal structure. These dynamics are discussed in the following pages and 
the FMS elections are detailed on pages 45 – 51. 
4. Finance, Flows of Resources and Political Budgets 
The PMF distinguishes between a public budget and a political budget. The former is obtained by 
taxes, other sovereign revenues, and public borrowing, and is (in principle) used for public goods in 
an accountable manner. By contrast the latter is typically opaque (“off-budget”) and may derive from 
natural resource rents, third-country assistance, aid or private sector payments. Often the boundary 
between the two is blurred as public resources are diverted to political ends. In Somalia, the central 
authority (i.e. the Federal Government) does not have primary control over political budgets as there 
are multiple actors and networks in a factionalised environment. Different powerbrokers and political 
entrepreneurs can access a range of commercial activities/external finance, foreign assistance and 
informal taxation thus leaving the political marketplace volatile. This contrasts with Somaliland’s 
oligopolist system where the political budget is relatively tightly controlled by the ruling party and its 
close oligarchs. By contrast, in Somalia, the political budgets are deeply unstable and vulnerable to 
external shocks and fierce internal competition. 
The major financial flows for Somalia’s political marketplace consist of: external finance (direct 
foreign assistance from Gulf countries for political or infrastructural development that falls into 
discretionary funds); elite capture of remittances (by way of fund-raising by political elites and the 
holding of liquidity by MTOs (Money Transfer Organisations) and their shareholders); contracts 
(humanitarian, security, and infrastructure rents); and capital flight that aids non-taxable wealth 
accumulation and the outflow from public budgets. Other sources include private capital (politicians’ 
ownership/shares in legitimate business, such as real estate, telecoms, construction and banking 
or transnational organised crime and illicit markets); and payments from industry/commerce in 
exchange for preferential treatment. Informal taxation from telecommunications, finance, ports, 
construction can serve as a key component of the political budgets and also as forms of in-kind 
loans provided in exchange for tax breaks.48 
In addition to the discretionary allocation of rents, market privileges and patronage through public 
employment are critical means through which the political marketplace functions.49 Public sector 
wages (the percentage of the budget allocated for civil service salaries, as well as military/security 
payroll relative to other public spending) as a share of GDP is frequently used as a measure of 
political patronage in different contexts. Human resource audits conducted by the World Bank track 
fluctuations in the size of the civil service, rates of staff turnover and the number of ghost workers, 
that are all indicative of the operations of the political marketplace. Recent informal reports show 
evidence that efforts to scale down the size of the civil service have been largely in vain.
47  Farah and Yasin both worked for Africa Muslim Agency, a Qatari-based Islamic charity (see Hoffman et al. 2017).
48  Hoffman et al. 2017. 
49  Levy, Brian. 2014. Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies, Oxford University Press. 
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Figures 8 and 9 provide a very broad indication of the relative importance of different sources that 
could be tapped for political finance and indicate that the levels of domestic revenue and foreign 
direct investment have been rising in recent years.50 Figure 8 plots the recorded fund flows in Somalia 
between 2015-18, and shows that while FGS revenue has increased marginally, it remains miniscule 
in comparison to the other major forms of fund flows. In particular, it is dwarfed by the flow of 
security arena funding (Figure 9). Very little concrete data is available on security arena funding in 
Somalia, but some estimates place this amount at about 1.5 billion dollars annually. The amounts 
represented on these graphs cannot be used as proxies for the actual flows of political funding in 
Somalia, but it is clear that the financial resources available to the government are a relatively small 
part of the overall political economy.51 
Figure 8: Financial Flows in Somalia (as % of GDP) - 2015-18
Source: Aid Coordination Unit 2019; Randa and Musuku 201852 
Figure 9: Estimated international financial support to the security arena in Somalia (in US$ millions 
per year)53
Source: Zacchia, Harborne and Sims 2017. 
50  Note that all budgetary and GDP data should be treated with extreme caution in Somalia. (a) There is no system of national 
accounts, and GDP is estimated on the basis of daily consumption per capita from the 2016 Somalia High Frequency Survey; estimates 
of government final consumption expenditure and public investment based on the fiscal accounts of the FGS and Federal Member 
States; import and export data from the IMF Directorate of Trade Statistics; and private capital formation estimates based on imports of 
machinery and construction material from UN-COMTRADE mirror data; (b) FDI and Remittance figures are estimates; (c) the Aid Coordi-
nation Unit has reported wildly different values for ODA, Remittances, FDI and revenue as a percentage of GDP in each of its 2017, 2018, 
and 2019 reports. See also Aid Coordination Unit 2018; Aid Coordination Unit 2017. 
51  Countries such as Qatar, UAE, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which have been major sources of political finance in recent years, simply 
do not provide information on their ‘support’ to different actors in Somalia. These ‘official’ fund flows also do not show what proportion 
of these funds can be diverted for use as part of the political budget.
52  2019 data was not available at the time of this report’s publication.
53  The $400 million provided by the USA-DOD is Somalia focused but spent on the wider Horn of Africa. 
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Different financial sources play a different role in the political economy of elections versus the 
larger tapestry of the elections. The ‘political-business cycle’ refers to the short-term practices 
of clientelism and attempts by the incumbent to stimulate the economy just prior to an election 
in order to improve prospects of being re-elected. This can include policy decisions to address 
unemployment, economic growth, and government spending on public services to direct handouts 
and patronage allocated through contracts. In Somalia, the siphoning of aid resources and flogging 
of public rents immediately prior to elections has been well-documented.54 Other actors (including 
intermediaries, local businesses and transnational actors) have provided in-kind loans and grants to 
ruling parties in exchange for favourable tax cuts ahead of elections. This was evident in how the DP 
World Berbera deal was concluded with an eye to elections in 2016.55 Others are part of the broader 
landscape of the political market and the political economy that include the complexity of business-
state relations, and commercial and diplomatic interests but which include the distortion of political 
and public power into privately negotiated forms of governance.
External patronage 
External rents – including from aid, security assistance, and foreign direct investment – affect the 
PMF in different ways depending on degree of central oversight. Many of the arrangements for 
foreign investment are not always subject to oversight or competitive bidding, or publication. These 
often extrabudgetary sources of external revenue include direct payments by foreign countries to 
MPs and government officials in order to affect certain policy shifts/outcomes and sway the vote 
in support of or against key governments. Between 2009-21, Gulf rivalries56 Qatar and the UAE (tied 
to ideological or geopolitical concerns) have been increasingly involved in providing political elites 
with campaign support in order to secure access to oil, port, and airport development projects.57 This 
became particularly the case after the post-2009 political transition when Kenya and Turkey began 
to play an increasing role in Somalia. Prior to the 2011 famine, Turkey had no history of involvement 
in Somalia and has since become a significant player, initially on a humanitarian basis but has since 
made significant investments in establishing diplomatic, security, and commercial ties. In alliance 
with Qatar, Turkey has safeguarded large investments including Turkish companies’ management of 
Mogadishu’s seaport and airport that has included payments to political figures as well as, within the 
last 12 months, certain government protections due to losses around Covid.58 
The Gulf Crisis has made Somalia a proxy ground for strategic rivalries across the wider region. 
Qatar59 and Turkey have supported the last two winning Presidents, vis-à-vis interlocutors that it works 
with (Farah Abdulqadir to Fahad Yasin), while the UAE, under Farmajo’s Presidency, has supported 
regional states and opposition, emboldening the bargaining power of sub-regional elites in the 
political market. One of the implications of these competing external actors has been chronic political 
paralysis and violent contestation. In past elections, the UAE is reported to have made payments 
to parliamentarians (including in Somaliland)60 and has directed considerable investments towards 
Puntland, Somaliland, and Galmudug. Investments by the Qatar and Turkey are notably not taking 
place in those areas as they are considered under UAE influence.61 Under increasing international 
54  Hagmann et al. 2018. 
55  Hoffmann et al., 2017; Stepputat, Finn and Tobias Hagmann. 2019. “Politics of Circulation: The Makings of the Berbera Corridor in 
Somali East Africa.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 37(5): 794-813. 
56  See Crisis Group. 2018. Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Africa Report N°260, 5 June. Brussels: International Crisis Group. https://www.
crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis; In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and a number of allies 
severed diplomatic relations with and imposed an economic blockade on Qatar, marking the onset of what has come to be known as the 
GCC crisis.
57  See Hoffman et al. 2017; Maxwell, D., and Majid, N. 2016. Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures, 2011–12, 
London: Hurst. The Gulf states of Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have a longer presence in Somalia, mostly through the sup-
port of Islamic charities from their respective countries, although state relations have also been important. 
58  Findings from ongoing research on business response to Covid in Somalia. 
59  Qatar is rumoured to have provided last minute financing to Farmaajo prior to the elections in 2017. Crisis Group 2018. 
60  Crisis Group 2015.
61  Crisis Group 2018; Crisis Group. 2019. Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact, Middle East Report N°206, 19 
September. Brussels: International Crisis Group; de de Waal, Alex. 2019. “Pax Africana or Middle East Security Alliance in the Horn of 
Africa and the Red Sea?” Occasional Paper No. 17, Conflict Research Program. Somerville, MA: World Peace Foundation. https://sites.
tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2019/01/Pax-Africana-or-Middle-East-Security-Alliance-finaL-2.pdf. 
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scrutiny and cooperation in broader compliance, money-laundering and trade negotiations, the UAE 
has changed its tactics, abandoning forms of direct political interference while continuing to pursue 
its corporate interests in port development and strategic infrastructures in Berbera, Bosasso and 
Hobyo. As geoeconomics replace or transform geopolitics in the region, new opportunities for trade 
and economic integration are increasing the channels for negotiation, convergence and diversion. 
Ethiopia and Kenya who are both involved in providing extrabudgetary security assistance are also 
critical trading partners who have stakes in broader economic development initiatives. Ethiopia has 
undoubtedly been one of the most influential actors in Somalia, and since the election of Prime 
Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018, taken a much stronger position in support of the Federal Government 
of President Farmajo, including in supporting the Federal Government’s interventions in regional 
elections, abandoning support to regional actors (see Section 7 below). This also reflects the 
influence of Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki, who took the opportunity provided by PM Abiy’s 
opening to create a security pact with Addis Ababa and an aspirational axis of autocrats throughout 
the Horn. Although Isaias has little to offer in terms of financial resources, Eritrea provides a secure 
and unpublicized base for military training of special forces and the strategic advice of the region’s 
most accomplished political survivor.
Kenya has become more directly involved in Somalia over the last ten years following the rise of Al-
Shabaab with political, military and financial support provided to regional actors and its own forces 
at the border. In addition to providing troops committed to AMISOM focused on the border region 
of Jubbaland, with whom it has its only border, Kenya has been accused of supporting Madobe 
against the central government. The maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia has raised the 
profile of Kenya’s involvement and the contestation around Jubbaland and has been instrumental 
in deteriorated relationships between Kenya and the FGS but also facilitating new trade links with 
Somaliland (see below).62 
Logistics and humanitarian contracts/resources 
The logistics industry is a highly significant part of the Somalia political economy given its position 
along critical trade and maritime corridors that link import/export sectors, trade, and infrastructural 
development to the delivery of post-conflict reconstruction aid and humanitarian assistance.63 New 
research on geoeconomics and the ‘logistics revolution’ reveal how transactional and relational 
structures along key networked infrastructures, trade corridors, gateways, logistics hubs, and markets 
are critical to understanding contemporary transformations of the global political economy.64 The 
allocation of rents and participation in this economy has since the post-independence period served 
as the primary strategy for managing elite and clan interests, where powerbrokers in this sector 
exert considerable authority over state policies and where the state has repeatedly accused donors 
of empowering these actors.65 
Key powerbrokers who had captured the largest contracts during the war have since played a critical 
role in politics and have built construction empires and monopolised access around import/export, 
clearance, and customs.66 Ex-President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud himself was a WFP contractor 
prior to his election in 2012, demonstrating how contracting had become central to the circulation of 
political finance and the accumulation of wealth and power.67 In this way business, aid and politics 
have become deeply interconnected in ways that blur the lines between political and public budgets 
62  See Crisis Group. 2020. “Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia.” Africa Briefing N°158, 14 July. Brussels: Internation-
al Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b158-ending-dangerous-standoff-southern-somalia.
63  Jaspars, S., Adan, G. and Majid, N. 2020. Food and Power in Somalia: Business as Usual? A scoping study on the political economy 
of food following shifts in food assistance and in governance, London: London School of Economics and Political Science. http://eprints.
lse.ac.uk/103138/. 
64  Stepputat and Hagmann 2019; Khalili, Laleh. 2020. Sinews of War and Trade: Shipping and Capitalism in the Arabian Peninsula, 
London and New York: Verso. 
65  An in-depth analysis of how political clientelism operates through contracts is provided in Elder, Claire. 2021. “Powerbrokers and 
Somalia’s violent political economy: theorising about the logistics industry, reigning ‘tenderpreneurs’ and protracted state collapse.” 
African Affairs. 
66  See Jaspars et al. 2020 for reference to the role of powerbrokers in the shift from food to cash assistance. 
67  Hoffman et al. 2017.
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as political figures move fluidly between political positions and top aid agencies, often owning 
logistics companies that benefit from public and aid contracts. 
Figure 10 indicates the relative importance of humanitarian aid in comparison to ODA, notably that 
humanitarian aid is a fluctuating but often very significant component of overall ODA. The changing 
modality of aid therefore has implications for political economy dynamics.68 
Figure 10: Humanitarian Aid as a Percentage of Total ODA (2000-2016)
[Source: Majid et al. 2018]
At the local and regional level, elites use aid contracts to buy-off community support, maintain 
relevance and negotiate with the state.69 Many NGO owners and District Commissioners have 
benefited from the availability and capture of aid resources through their agencies and/or through 
the contracts and resources available locally.70 Ownership or control of an NGO can therefore provide 
the political finance to enter the political marketplace. The pervasiveness of these risks and practices 
was revealed again in late 2020 with the withdrawal of the Italian NGO, InterSoS, from Johar in 
Somalia after many years in the region.71 It continues to affect the costs and leverage of local-
subnational-and national negotiations. Attempts to shift from food aid to cash assistance in order to 
limit such accumulation of wealth and power has affected degrees of financing going through food 
aid but also reproduced the power structures of the largest conglomerates. 
The cash assistance that is now distributed through multiple agencies (and contracts) has largely 
benefitted money transfer and telecommunications companies (and disproportionately Hormuud).72 
Large MTOs Dahabshiil and Hormud are conglomerates which benefit from the absence of regulation 
and anti-trust law to monopolise the industries of construction, telecommunications, finance, and 
energy. Hormuud is the majority shareholder in Golis (in Puntland) and Telesom (in Somaliland) as 
of 2002, majority owner of Salaama Bank, as well as Al Buruuj construction and Banadir Electricity 
Company (which funded the merger of seven private electricity companies in Mogadishu in 2014). 
Likewise, Dahabshiil owns Somtel, Dahabshiil Homes and are majority stakeholders in SomPower.73 
As both the Central Banks of Somalia and Somaliland operate at a very basic level, with challenges 
of politicisation and extremely limited ability to steer monetary policy, such programmes can also 
affect the political budget by causing fluctuations in currency exchange.74 In addition, the large 
68  This is discussed in relation to the shift from food aid to cash-based interventions in Jaspars et al. 2020. 
69  Elder 2021; Hagmann, Tobias, et al. 2020. Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. 
70  The Security Minister of Jubaland, Abdirashid ‘Janaan’ rose to prominence in part due to the capture and control of humanitarian 
resources in Dolo, from 2011. 
71  See Parker, Ben. 2020. “Italian NGO pulls out of Somalia due to ‘systematic fraud’, ‘Because of procurement issues, people 
got killed in this country,’” The New Humanitarian.9 Nov. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/11/9/somalia-east-afri-
ca-NGO-fraud-withdrawal-health-care-hospital. 
72  Jaspars et al. 2020.
73  Hoffman et al. 2017.
74  UNMG 2013; International Monetary Fund. 2016. “World Bank Makes Progress to Support Remittance Flows to Somalia.” IMF Press 
Release. 10 June. 
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injection of aid for infrastructure channelled through Somalia between 2017 and 201975–as part 
of a shift in development and security discourse about the value of ‘critical noncontroversial solid 
outputs’ purported to ‘rewire socio-political relations’76– has created new rents that offset any losses 
of food aid within the political marketplace. 
Revenue generation – taxation at seaports, airports, checkpoints 
Similar to contracting and procurement, high informal and low formal taxation practices are critical to 
the political budget. Current taxation of telecommunication companies and airlines, still low at less 
than 1.9 percent in 2017, indicates the ongoing prevalence of government loans for basic functioning 
in exchange for tax cuts. In addition, non-state actors compete over the collection of informal taxes 
(customs, road, and business taxes) that undermine central control over certain types of political 
rents.77 Groups, like Al-Shabaab, continue to control the informal taxation of agricultural products 
(bananas and sugar), and urban businesses.78 Yet, livestock traders do not view Al-Shabaab taxes 
through zakat as onerous because it has generally meant a reduction in costs given the concomitant 
reduction of clan-based/warlord transit taxes to be paid at checkpoints. They argue: “you pay Al-
Shabaab once, and the government four times”.79
Despite having lost control over taxable urban centres and certain sectors of the informal economy 
(including charcoal and cross-border trade in arms and sugar), leverage in new sectors allows 
them to continue to exert control over public authority. In other cases, the primary judication of 
land disputes at Al-Shabaab courts provide important political revenue. Such informal taxation and 
revenue streams along critical trade corridors–also from livestock, remittances (from foreign-wage 
earners) and export-import markets– increase the leverage of non-state and regional actors in deal-
making. Understanding market shifts and fluctuations in the availability of such political finance to 
different groups is critical for determining the cost of loyalty (or consent) and their leverage within 
the political marketplace. 
Ports remain the primary source of revenue for the central government and non-state actors with 
Al-Shabaab exerting control over revenues in Mogadishu and Kismayo. Revenue collection amounts 
are very different between the four ports; 2016 figures highlight that Berbera generates by far the 
highest revenue, at US$150m, followed by Mogadishu (US$80m), Bosasso (US$23m) and Kismayo 
(US4.5m).80 Tax revenue at Mogadishu seaport has been growing rapidly following Turkish investment 
and the incorporation of the port into global container shipping systems. Yet Mogadishu business 
community report Al-Shabaab infiltration of Mogadishu port logs, accessing data held by commercial 
shipping agents and demanding “taxation” payments from businesses who import goods.
As well as major revenue streams at the ports and state capitals, many checkpoints and local markets 
provide significant tax revenues that enter the political marketplace at decentralised levels. For 
example, tax revenue collected in Belet Weyn and Johar are estimated to generate US $20,000/week 
for politico-military actors who control these areas. In the case of Johar, for example, the recently 
elected president, previously the Vice-President and Governor of the Johar town, is considered the 
local strongman who provides security through his large militia and controls taxation. Abdi-Rashid 
Janaan, the Security Minister of Jubbaland and strongman of North Gedo, profits from control and 
taxation of cross-border trade.81 
75  This comprised in addition to UNOPS’s US$1.5 billion dollar annual budget, an additional $370 million channeled between 2017 
and 2019 through the Somalia Infrastructure Fund (SIF), the World Bank’s Somalia Urban Resilience Project (SURP), the African Develop-
ment Bank Group and the Qatar Infrastructure Fund.
76  For projects like USAID’s TIS+ in Somalia, the construction ‘process’ became more valuable than the road itself, as a tool to manu-
facture bonds between state-society and among communities. Bachmann and Schouten 2018. 
77  Marchal, Roland. 1996.  Final Report on the Post-Civil War Somali Business Class, Nairobi: European Commission/Somali Unit. 
78  UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, 2020. “Final Report to the United Nations Security Council, S/2020/949, 28 September. https://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2020_949.pdf.  
79  Interview data, Mogadishu, July and October 2019. 
80  Cantens, Thomas. 2018. “Somalia: Assessment of Customs Revenue Potential and Proposals for Reform.” World Customs Organi-
zation Research Unit. World Bank Somalia Governance Program with Support from UK Department for International Development (DfID).
81  His power also comes from his alliance with Ethiopian forces and additional finance from aid taxation. 
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Business 
In Somalia like in many other conflict-affected countries the private sector has a missing middle – 
there is a small number of large companies (often preferentially owned by members of the elite) and 
a large number of small ones.82 What is missing is a range of medium-sized enterprises that could 
assist in regulating the political marketplace and represent a ‘middle class’ that lobbies for reform 
and regulation.83 Over time, a transnational business class and transnational conglomerates have 
developed where transactions, financial services, and foreign exchange are located in foreign cities 
(Dubai, Djibouti, Nairobi) but where these businesses are heavily involved in domestic politics in 
order to protect assets and secure new opportunities. The actions and interest of this transnational 
business network has been informed by the legacy of state predation and violent conflict – that 
skewed economic opportunities and damaged commercial networks; with losses of trust; and 
political and economic uncertainty – whereby businesses have relied on external intermediaries and 
personal and social networks, as well as on arrangements with non-state governance actors (e.g. 
traditional leaders or insurgent groups) and political entrepreneurs, to protect property and survive 
economically.84 The traditional bourgeoisie involved in ‘big business’ in telecommunications, finance 
and trade and political entrepreneurs involved in construction, transport and logistics have different 
roles and interests in the political marketplace.85 
Those involved in the powerbroker industries of import-export, construction/logistics, and services 
are more active in the deal-making space and create the conditions for ‘bad politics’ based on securing 
preferential treatment and securing friends in high places.86 These actors use territorial control, 
access to strategic infrastructure and foreign exchange in order to protect assets and secure new 
opportunities.87 These businesses cope with containing cost and risk by stashing wealth abroad and 
by avoiding growth in order to circumvent the attention of governance providers and armed actors, 
who may wish to extract or assume a stake in an expanding business.88 This is critical as it contributes 
to a landscape of financial opacity, illiquidity and capital flight, as ‘being successful’ increases social 
demands for payouts from society and the state.89 Thus, while Somali businesses still maintain a 
high degree of autonomy from the state given their control over access to foreign exchange with 
the capacity to block key legislation around banking and telecommunication interconnectivity, it is 
not an ‘economy without a state’ per se90 as political entrepreneurs, conglomerates and technocrats 
are entangled in a web of political clientelism, kickbacks and redistribution, and debt relations.91 
This trend is evident particularly in the large number of logistics contractors who have since run for 
elected office to recoup debts from the civil war and to protect business interests, instrumentalising 
socio-economic grievances to agitate against state intervention in the economy and society, and 
moving fluidly amongst political factions.92
82  Davis, P., Spearing, M. and Thorpe, J. 2018. Private Sector Development in Countries Progressing to Peace and Prosperity, HEART 
Report, Oxford: HEART. 
83  There is an interesting comparison with Somaliland and Puntland, where livestock traders – who comprise vertically integrated 
networks of large, medium and small businesses – played a crucial role in stabilizing politics in the 1990s.
84  Hoffmann, A. and Lange, P. 2016. Growing or Coping? Evidence from small and medium sized enterprises in fragile settings. CRU 
Report. The Hague: Clingendael Institute. 
85  Elder 2021. 
86  Pritchett, Lant, Kunal Sen, and Eric Werker. 2018. “Searching for a ‘Recipe’ for Episodic Development,” in Deals and Development: 
The Political Dynamics of Growth Episodes, Edited by Lant Pritchett, Kunal Sen, and Eric Werker, Oxford University Press, 342-343.
87  Brück, T, Fitzgerald, V. and Grigsby, A. 2000. Enhancing the Private Sector Contribution to Post-War Recovery in Poor Countries: A 
Report to the Department for International Development, University of Oxford, Finance and Trade Policy Research Center.
88  Elder 2021.
89  Ibid.
90  Little, Peter. 2003. Somalia: Economy Without State, Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Mubarak, Jamal A. 1997. “The “hidden 
hand” behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia.” World Development, 25(12): 2027-20; and Little, Peter D. 2014. Eco-
nomic and Political Reform in Africa: Anthropological Perspectives, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
91  Elder 2021.
92  Ibid. 
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Private sector actors have actively facilitated, influenced, and bankrolled key political developments 
including peacebuilding conferences from 1991 onwards: the 2000 Arta conference, the establishment 
of the Islamic Courts Union and subsequent elections from 2012 that have accrued substantial 
debts.93 Political entrepreneurs in different administrations try to manage the market through 
accommodation and by exchanging loyalty and economic rents, but different interests, business ethos, 
and access to social capital, affect the cost of doing business.94 Public financial management and 
revenue generation reforms have increased taxation of businesses and corporations but negotiations 
and distortions are still pervasive as the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated with 
import/export traders negotiating tax relief (see below). In addition, the perceptions around non-
transparency and corruption, the use of public goods and political power for private and not public 
means is a large preoccupation that informs redistribution politics and acceptability around the 
Somali political marketplace. 
In south-central Somalia the landscape of power and business is extraordinarily complex, much 
more so than in Puntland and Somaliland. This is specifically linked to dependency on foreign aid and 
conflict legacies.95 Corporate support to political figures and campaigns leads to preferential access 
to government contracts and the collective mobilisation against governments and leaders who seek 
to dominate others that underpin the fluidity of factions and anti-incumbency. Across the Somali 
regions, Chambers of Commerce are often comprised of the largest corporate actors who lobby for 
business actors and serve as an important check on state power and interventions. For instance, 
in Jubbaland, the Jubbaland Chamber of Commerce mediates the interests of businessmen with 
that of President Ahmed Madobe but this works as a more symbiotic, negotiated arrangement than 
is evident in Mogadishu. Madobe benefits from taxing trade through Kismayo and borrows money 
from businessmen. He pays for these loans by granting tax exemptions. 
Covid and the marketplace 
As COVID-19 spread in the Horn of Africa from the end of March, it has critically shaped aspects 
of Somalia’s political economy by reducing revenues and aid flows while increasing expenditures. 
Throughout the first half of 2020, the FGS’ income from taxes on international trade dropped by 
approximately a third, picking up only very slightly in the third quarter.96 Adding to this strain, the 
tax relief measures implemented by the FGS to ensure the affordability of foodstuffs put further 
pressure on the government’s coffers. While the FGS tried to make up for the losses by raising taxes 
on other goods, such as plastic bags, cosmetics, and tobacco products,97 the net effect of COVID-19 
on the FGS’ tax revenues proved to be negative.98 Substantial corruption scandals emerged around 
the distribution of COVID aid, including around the ministry of health, paving the way for the COVID-19 
response to be moved to the Office of the Prime Minister rather than under the health ministry.99 
Throughout the response, supplies (often times donor-branded) continued to find their way to the 
marketplace, as actors involved in the response diverted supplies in order to resell them.100 
Access to political finance has also been hurt by shocks to the informal economy, remittances and 
external financial shocks hitting economies in the Gulf and Asia. In terms of the latter, businesses 
cited deteriorating business relationship with Saudi Arabia and UAE due to COVID-related policies 
93  Marchal 1996; Hansen, Stig Jarle. 2007. Civil War economies, the hunt for profit and the incentives for peace (The case of Somalia); 
Ahmad 2017. 
94  de Waal 2015. 
95  Hoffmann et al. 2017. 
96  Federal Government of Somalia. Ministry of Finance. 2020. “Financial Statements 2019” and “Financial Statements 2020.” 
Accessed 16 November 2020. https://mof.gov.so/publication/; elaboration by the authors. As seen above, taxes on international trade 
are particularly important because they make up a large share of the FGS’ revenues (in 2019, almost a third of the government’s overall 
revenue, including both domestic and foreign sources).
97  Phone interview with a civil servant at the FGS’ Ministry of Finance, Mogadishu, September 2020.
98  The amount of tax revenues collected by the FGS between January and September 2020 was 10% lower than the amount collected 
in the same period of 2019.
99  Khalif, A. 2020. “Somalia jails four government officials for stealing Covid-19 funds.” The East African, 25 August. Accessed 24 
December 2020. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/somalia-jails-four-government-officials-for-stealing-cov-
id-funds-1925460.
100  Garowe Online. 2020. “Somalia: Former president alleges loss of COVID-19 donations to black market in Mogadishu.” Garowe 
Online. 25 May. Accessed 24 December 2020. https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-former-president-alleg-
es-loss-of-covid-19-donations-to-black-market-in-mogadishu.
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relating to trade and migration, and a strengthening of trade ties with Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain, and 
Oman that will shape the regional structures of the political marketplace – these countries “are 
working with Somali businessmen to come up with a faster way to deliver goods into Somalia”.101 
Yet, the fact that the larger conglomerates served as a critical part of the government’s COVID-
taskforce, meant they were also disproportionately able to leverage their loans and access to tax 
cuts to consolidate market control squeezing out smaller players. While aid for construction and 
government contracting have notably dried up, which often serve as a lucrative form of patronage, 
politicians are reportedly taking advantage of tax cuts leading to a significant surplus of these 
foodstuffs and destabilizing prices in the market.102 
At election time, a squeeze on political budgets is likely to serve the interests of the incumbents as 
it limits the available capital for the opposition and other non-state actors seeking to challenge or 
disrupt the political process. The thawing of relations in the Gulf between the UAE/Saudi and Qatar 
will diminish the patronage going to Farmajo’s administration where external capital has been used 
for parliamentary backing and backing favorable incumbent candidates but will also hamper the 
leverage of presidential candidates in seeking to exploit divisions among Gulf states to support 
campaigns. This will diminish rent-seeking opportunities in the political space, that has already 
provided the condition for the Union of Candidates, but also is likely to see reliance on violence 
where access to capital is diminished. 
5. Control of Violence 
As noted elsewhere in this piece, a central feature of the political marketplace is that while the 
relative power and identities of those who participate in a given market are constantly changing, the 
rules governing the market remain largely unchanged. Regarding the control and uses of violence in 
various parts of Somalia, this means that describing the current specific balance of power between 
groups of armed actors (which differs considerably between and sometimes within regions) is less 
illuminating then exploring the following two dynamics: 
•	 The common types of relationships between armed actors and the patrons who rent or 
otherwise command their loyalty. 
•	 The common goals patrons pursue using armed actors.
The patrons examined here are the leaderships of FGS, the various FMSs, Al-Shabaab, business elites, 
and external state actors. The armed actors are the Somali National Army and police, the various 
formal FMS forces, clan militias, and Al-Shabaab forces. A final important group, ordinary Somalis, 
is represented here by the citizens of Galkaio. The characteristics and history of this particular town 
is described in Section 6, but its relevance for discussing the control of violence derives from a 
detailed and recent survey of the attitudes of Galkaio citizens toward their own security and the 
armed actors who provide or threaten it.103 The opinions of the people of Galkaio are almost certainly 
not representative of all Somalis. However, they shed useful light on the pressures and processes 
that shape such opinions and represent a partial counter to the common practice of external actors 
making poorly-founded assumptions about what common Somali attitudes must be. 
Finally, it is critical to understand that the boundaries of membership for all of the groups above are 
constantly shifting, and that many if not most individuals that could be described as patrons or as 
violence/security providers are members, to varying degrees, of multiple categories simultaneously. 
101  Phone interview with a trader in the foodstuffs import sector, Kismayo, October 2020.
102  Phone interview with a business manager in the foodstuffs import sector, Bosaso, October 2020.
103  Detzner, Gasser, Abdirahman and Majid, forthcoming “Mapping the Security and Justice Perceptions and Demands of the Citizens 
of Galkaio.” Conflict Research Programme Research Memo, LSE.
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The FGS 
It is important to state first that the interests of the FGS as explored here are largely synonymous with 
the interests of the whoever currently holds the presidency and the coalition of clan and business 
interests who support him. The FGS does not yet have strong institutional interests that persist 
regardless of incumbent. 
However mutable the government, it is very much in the interests of external actors, particularly in 
relation to security and defence, that an entity plausibly called “the government of Somalia” exists. 
Many activities that these actors want or need to engage in for their own interests – signing base 
hosting agreements, transferring arms and training troops (to counter terrorism and/or piracy), 
securing agreements for one’s own troops to enter Somali territory – will only be perceived as 
legitimate, at home and abroad, if engaged in with a local partner with an internationally recognized 
claim to state sovereignty. Further, for those actors genuinely concerned with stabilizing Somalia, 
the first step to a stable state is understood to be the existence of a central government, with the 
second step the establishment of that government’s legitimate monopoly over violence through the 
control of a national army and police. 
This context is necessary to explain the nature of the current Somali National Army. Barre’s 
transformation of the Somali Army into clan-unit based militias is discussed elsewhere in this piece. 
Despite the extensive resources poured into the effort by numerous external actors, and pledges by 
subsequent Somali leaders to meaningfully reduce the salience of clan identity within the force, little 
changed in subsequent decades.104 
The SNA is, rather than an institution, more of a strategically deployed brand. When this brand is 
applied to clan militias and other ad hoc forces supporting whomever the current FGS President 
happens to be, the actions of those militias gain enhanced legitimacy, at least externally. As or more 
importantly, when wearing the SNA “brand” these forces (real or existing only on paper) become 
eligible for training, equipment, and other valuable support from external actors. As noted elsewhere 
in this paper, security rents, of this and several other types, are a critical source of political finance for 
FGS leaders. Tellingly, when various government-aligned actors use larger scale organized violence 
(for example, to counter Al-Shabaab, contest a border, or try to influence regional elections), they rely 
on those parts of the army that drawn from their clan and its allies – they cannot be certain that other 
parts of the SNA will be sufficiently motivated to follow orders.105
In light of these factors, it has actually been very much not in the interests of subsequent FGS 
administrations for the SNA to become a true national army. If a given administration persists in 
power for more than a single term, it will not want to lose rents from external SSR (Security Sector 
Reform) assistance by allowing the goal of that assistance to be reached. In the more likely event 
that an administration loses power (due to the Somali anti-incumbency trend noted elsewhere) an 
FGS leader who permits the development of an SNA loyal to the Somali state over and above clan 
ties is handing his successor a tool that may well be used against him. The current state of affairs 
allows such a leader much more flexibility – clan militias that have been theoretically but not actually 
folded into the SNA can and do drop their SNA affiliation when the FGS changes hands, so that when 
a leader loses office he can expect to, in effect, take a part of the army with him in the form of those 
militias drawn from his clan and allies.
Additionally, as noted elsewhere, many Somali leaders also have financial interests in the extensive 
private security forces that would inevitably lose business if an effective SNA were to render 
their services unnecessary. This last dynamic also helps explain the FGS’ reluctance to promote 
an effective police force. The continued weakness of the SNA has in the past has, further, helped 
justify the continued presence of AMISOM, which frees subsequent FGS administrations from both 
the expense of, and responsibility for, countering Al-Shabaab and providing security in particularly 
critical areas of Mogadishu and elsewhere. 
104  Menkhaus, Ken. 2016. “Managing risk in ungoverned space: Local and international actors in Somalia.” SAIS Review of Internation-
al Affairs 36(1): 109-120. 
105  Hoffman et al. 2017. 
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However, despite these constraints, there is some interesting evidence that the SNA is able to play a 
limited but effective role in some circumstances – namely, when the pressure to play a dual role as 
clan defender and combat force is not present. In Galkaio, one provision of the 2017 peace agreement 
was that armed actors (ambiguously clan militias/FMS forces) of the contending sides would retreat 
from town, and, to prevent a security vacuum in the economically-critically central business district, 
SNA forces (funded by the FGS and thus loyal to neither side) would occupy the area and provide basic 
security. In interviews with citizens of Galkaio, a substantial majority of those from many different 
walks of life (affiliated with either side or none) praised the SNA’s effectiveness and impartiality 
in this limited mission.106 SNA forces were perceived especially favourably by respondents hailing 
from minority clans or otherwise marginalized, who felt exploited and discriminated against by the 
security and justice forces of the area’s dominant clans.107 
Finally, the dynamics described in this section, while they have endured for several decades, can 
always shift if the interests of the parties change. Most significantly, there has been growing 
evidence in recent years that FGS President Farmajo has in fact been trying to train troops whose 
primary loyalty is intended to be the FGS as an institution rather than to their various clans. This 
break from past practice is likely fuelled by, first, a shift in demand – Farmajo, unlike past FGS 
presidents, does not hail from a clan large or well-armed enough to provide him with a sizable and 
durable base of armed support, and thus has much stronger incentives to develop his own force. 
Further, there has been a shift in supply – Turkey, and, more recently and notably Eritrea, have been 
willing to invest focused resources in training troops to this specific end, while AMISOM’s planned 
departure may reduce the scale of other SSR efforts (and thus the rents to be gleaned from 
these).108 However, there is much less evidence that this attempt has been successful – while the 
outcome of the current chaotic electoral situation is uncertain, it does not seem that Farmajo has 
sufficient forces to impose a centralized authoritarian outcome, and in future factional leaders are 
likely to be on their guard for any similar attempts by future FGS leaders.
The FMS 
The role of the FMSs109 in controlling and deploying violence is difficult to summarize with any 
brevity because it varies so greatly by state. However, certain basic incentive structures apply. Firstly, 
generally speaking, a given member of the armed forces has three entities theoretically competing 
for his loyalty – the clan, the FMS, and the SNA/FGS.
As previously discussed, the SNA is almost never positioned to win this struggle for loyalties, as it is 
in the interest of no major actor, including (under most administrations) the FGS, that it should be a 
cohesive enough institution to do so. This means the real competition for the loyalty of official and 
semi-official armed forces takes place between states (FMS), clans, and, for specific units, foreign 
patrons. 
The outcomes of the competition between FMS and clan exist on a spectrum. In Somaliland, the 
demographic and political dominance of a single clan has largely eliminated instances where clan 
and state loyalties come into conflict for security force members. This, combined with several 
decades of institution building, has resulted in forces with relatively strong institutional identities – 
the military, etc. of an aspiring sovereign state along fairly standard lines. 
In Puntland, relative peace has been maintained through a durable clan bargain, again reducing the 
probability that a that a given security force member will face conflicting demands from state and 
clan. The competition for loyalty between elders and elected state authorities is further muted by the 
fact that both are incentivized to maintain their shared security forces as distinct entities from the 
SNA but organized and behaving in such a way that externals can treat them as the armed forces of a 
106  Quote from SNA commander, Galkaio interviews.
107  Galkaio interviews.
108  Maruf, Harun. 2021. “Clandestine Training of Somali Forces in Eritrea Stirs Families’ Concern.” Voice of America, 19 Feb. https://
www.voanews.com/africa/clandestine-training-somali-forces-eritrea-stirs-families-concern. 
109  Somaliland is also discussed here despite its more autonomous status. 
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legitimate governing unit, rather than non-state actors. This has meant that external actors who wish 
to operate in these areas both can (because of the patina of legitimacy) and, as a practical matter, 
must, provide security resources that go largely to state leaders rather than the FGS. Both Puntland 
and Somaliland forces have received extensive training, equipment, and other support directly from 
the United States, the UAE, and others.110 
However, interviews with elders from Galkaio as well as other informants suggest that, should 
Puntland’s political clan-bargain ever break down, many if not most of Puntland security forces 
would place their loyalty to clan ahead of their loyalty to Puntland as an entity. Even further along 
this spectrum, in most of the states currently allied to the FGS, the states themselves are too newly-
established as institutional actors to compete with armed actors’ longstanding clan loyalties. 
Concerningly, in most of these states, relying on clan-based loyalty as the organizing principle for the 
security forces has led minority clan members and groups who are left comparatively unprotected 
outside of this structure vulnerable to exploitation, sometimes (as subsequently discussed) fuelling 
a turn to Al-Shabaab as protector/redresser of grievances.111 
Jubbaland emerges a moderate deviation from this pattern – President Madobe, as previously 
noted, has in the past refused to take the side of his clan members to the extent commonly expected, 
and minorities clans reportedly suffer fewer abuses of power than elsewhere. However, the core 
of Madobe’s forces are still his clan sallies. and his limited space to act counter to clan interests 
appears to be the exception in southern and central Somalia. It currently seems unlikely that these 
developments will coalesce into a durable alternate model where a state leader commands loyalty 
from primarily personal rather than clan identity.
Al-Shabaab
Numerous commentators over the last several years have noted Al-Shabaab’s increasing resemblance 
to a mafia-esque organized crime operation – state takeover may or may not continue to be the 
organization’s ultimate goal, but even without the prospect of eventual victory the group would still 
be positioned to attract more than sufficient resources, through strategic rentals of violence and/or 
protection services, to maintain itself indefinitely. 
Like most organizations of this kind, its persistence is partially explained by examining the utility it 
provides for various actors. Menkaus notes ‘Politicians, soldiers, clans, some businesses, the FGS, 
and some national contingents in the African Union peacekeeping forces have all at one time or 
another actively colluded with Al-Shabaab for reasons that range from the tactical to the venal to the 
instinct to survive.’112 In particular, the organization is known for carrying out political assassinations 
for hire that can be said to be “low-cost” to the purchaser, in that by acting through Al-Shabaab, 
a politician or business person can have a rival assassinated with sufficient plausible deniability 
to avoid sparking a cycle of clan retribution.113 Further, those politicians and businesspeople who 
provide protection and other services to NGOs and other foreign contingents both must continually 
pay off the group for protection, but would also see much of their lucrative business dry up if the 
security situation improved significantly. 
At several levels, Al-Shabaab is an always-available option for those who cannot “bid” for the protection 
of themselves or their property through other means. Menkhaus has noted that ‘marginalized and 
aggrieved clans’ are especially liable to form partnerships with Al-Shabaab when unable to otherwise 
have grievances redressed by the FGS or an FMS’, and that, unsurprisingly, ‘the worst instance of 
tactical clan support to Al-Shabaab has occurred among lineages in areas liberated from Al-Shabaab 
control, after which clan-based brigades in the Somali army occupy and claim land from the newly 
liberated communities. That predatory behavior by Somali armed forces drives communities right 
110  Albrecht, Peter. 2018. “The interplay of interventions and hybridisation in Puntland’s security sector.” Cooperation and Conflict 
53(2): 216-236.
111  Galkaio Interviews, September 2020; Menkhaus 2016. 
112  Menkhaus 2016. 
113  Galkaio interview, September 2018. 
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into Al-Shabaab’s arms.’114 This dynamic is echoed at the individual level in Galkaio, where multiple 
informants noted that the marginalized are especially susceptible to Al-Shabaab recruitment because 
of their exclusion from justice and security by dominant clans. This in turn motivates Al-Shabaab to 
undermine local peace agreements (as seems to be taking place currently in Galkaio) which threaten 
to decrease their number of recruits and demand for their services.115
External actors 
A wide range of external actors are engaged in Somalia, pursuing an even wider array of goals. 
Where force is necessary to achieve a particular goal, an external actor has three main options:
•	 Use one’s own soldiers directly. Given constraints of cost, logistics, and international norms, 
this option is largely pursued only by neighbours most invested in and impacted by Somalia’s 
security situation—Kenya and Ethiopia.
•	 Rely on AMISOM. AMISOM is the force best equipped to achieve a wide range of goals – in 
areas where it is the primary security provider, like Villa Somalia, it could theoretically go 
as far as enforcing the terms of a political settlement (ensuring incumbents don’t overstay, 
etc.). However, the many states who must agree in order for a multilateral force to take action 
mean that, in practice, AMSIOM is largely employed for pursuing the core set of limited goals 
that meet the interests of all its international sponsors, such as counter-piracy and providing 
security to key parts of Mogadishu. 
•	 Rent the services of Somali security actors. These rentals can be pursued with varying levels 
of commitment, with long-term investment in a dedicated force on one end of the spectrum 
(for example, investments in counter-terrorism and counter-piracy units largely under foreign 
direction in Puntland) and short-term deals with interchangeable armed actors on the other. 
It should be noted that external actors that rent armed force are not all states – business 
interests also frequently make such contracts.
The shifting dynamics over time are discussed extensively elsewhere in this piece. The primary 
factors dictating how external actors shape what the market for controlling violence has looked like 
and will look like going forward are:
•	 the quantity of different external actors interested in renting;
•	 whether the total amount of resources available in the market increasing or decreasing; and
•	 the distribution of resources amongst bidding actors, with options including a few large 
bidders, many smaller ones, or some combination.
At the present moment, these factors are very much in flux – the particulars of Ethiopia’s partial 
withdrawal, Kenya’s enhanced and explicitly anti-FGS engagement, and AMISOM’s withdrawal 
timeline are explored elsewhere in this piece. However, the shape of the market, rather than the 
particular actors, will have a major impact on how, when, and to what degree violence is used going 
forward. Moe has suggested that the need for local bargaining among Somali elites – bargaining 
which has in several instances led to peace agreements and/or general stabilization - decreases as 
the number of outside actors available to elites as alternative trading partners increases.116 At the 
same time, a drastic decrease in the total amount of resources available can lead domestic actors 
to dramatically increase their use of predatory violence in an attempt to replace external revenues, a 
pattern de Waal has explored, using a political marketplace lens, in South Sudan.117 This is especially 
concerning given the number of units of armed actors, trained and equipped by external actors, that a 
badly-managed disengagement by these actors might leave behind. The future of the units, who are 
now accustomed to operating wholly or partially outside of the authority of the central government, 
state governments, and even the clans, is concerning and difficult to predict.
114  Menkhaus 2016.
115  https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/12/shabaab-assassinates-high-ranking-military-officials-in-central-somalia.php 
116  Moe, Louise Wiuff. 2018. “Counter-insurgency in the Somali territories: the ‘grey zone ‘between peace and pacification.” Interna-
tional Affairs 94(2): 319-341.
117  de Waal 2015.
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6. (Informal) Norms and Constraints
While the transactional and coercive logic of the political marketplace, including the instrumentalization 
of (‘clan’) identity, helps to explain the dominant nature of political processes in Somalia, including 
under the current Federal arrangement, these are mediated by norms drawn from customary systems 
and Islam, as well as seen in peacemaking processes and civic activism. 
The ‘clan’ system
The use of ‘clan’ as an explanatory factor in Somali politics, society and economy remains salient 
but is complex and requires unpacking. Policymakers and some scholarship continue to use 
the term ‘clan’ as having a fixed, immutable meaning, that refers to clearly defined units, akin to 
tribes.118 The word ‘clan’ is often used freely by Somalis themselves, but is used elastically to refer 
to lineage groups at different levels of aggregation, where these different levels have different social 
and political meaning and characteristics. As Virginia Luling outlines, Somali genealogy is in fact a 
‘sophisticated construct’ with many contested relationships.119 She further explains that while clan-
ism rarely explains conflict, it does provide a critical framework through which politics act: ‘it is not 
only good to fight with (or play politics with or do business with) but it is good to think with’.120 
Four important characteristics can be highlighted which reveal its use at different levels of 
aggregation.121 Perhaps the most fundamental unit is that associated with bloodwealth or bloodmoney 
(diya), which remains used today as a common level of identity for recompensing homicide or other 
injuries. Diya extends over a span of kinship representing between four and eight generations of 
common lineage and is the most coherent unit at which military mobilisation takes place. Secondly, 
diya is negotiated through a form of social contract known as xeer. Social contracts take place both 
within xeer (or customary system) and outside of it (e.g. through Islamic or other norms). Thirdly, 
processes of xeer and diya are most strongly present in pastoral society, which is most strongly 
associated with northern and central regions of Somalia. Social and customary norms in many areas 
of southern Somalia are more mixed, reflecting the influence of farming and agro-pastoral culture 
and livelihoods, particularly within the Digil and Mirifle and to a different extent, the Somali Bantu.122 
Finally, lineage identity is influenced and mobilised by the political context and the relative influence 
and power of individuals, who act as brokers. 
As indicated above but important to emphasise, the functioning of lineage units, even in pastoral 
societies, is not uniform; ‘history, migration and urbanization … have made each clan very distinct, 
even while they claim many commonalities’.123 This variegated history as well as the skills, 
motivation and power of political entrepreneurs (whether politicians or clan elders) plays a part in 
the instrumentalization of identity. In this sense, ‘clan’ identity is ‘deployed tactically’ by Somalis as 
‘a multipurpose, culturally constructed resource’, and lineage provides multiple potential identities 
which can be drawn upon, depending on circumstance and initiative.124 Political dynamics around 
the election in Jubbaland, described in section 7 below, provides an illustration of these dynamics in 
relation to the Ogadeen clan agglomeration. 
118  The classical version of this is the late colonial ethnography of Lewis (1961). One of the enduring legacies of British (late) colonial 
anthropology, of which this book forms a part, is the pre-occupation with kinship, clan or ethnic genealogy, and more generally, ideas of 
belonging - rather than processes of capital accumulation, class formation and social stratification (Hagmann 2016, 15). For exceptions, 
see de Waal, Alex. 1996. “Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia.” Discussion Paper. Mimeo. https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/238101910_CLASS_AND_POWER_IN_A_STATELESS_SOMALIA.; Samatar, Abdi, Lance Salisbury and Jonathan Bascom. 1988. “The 
Political Economy of Livestock Marketing in Northern Somalia.” African Economic History 17: 81-97. 
119  Luling, V. 2006. “Genealogy as Theory, Genealogy as Tool: Aspects of Somali ‘clanship,’” Social Identities, 12(4): 471-485.
120  Luling 2006, 471; see also de Waal, Alex. 2020. “Somalia’s disassembled state: clan unit formation and the political marketplace.” 
Conflict, Security & Development, 20(5): 561-585, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2020.1820160. 
121  Drawn from de Waal 2019.
122  Even within the Digil and Mirifle the relative importance of Somali pastoral norms vary, with some sub-clans more pastoral-based 
whereas others are more agricultural in their livelihoods and norms. See Helander, B. 1986. “The Social Dynamics of southern Somali 
Agro-Pastoralism: A Regional Approach.” in Conze, P. and Labahn, T. (eds.), Somalia: Agriculture in the winds of change. 93-113, Saar-
brucken-Schafbrucke: EPI Verlag.
123  Marchal 2007a, 1098.
124  Lewis, Ioan. 1998. “Doing Violence to Ethnography: A Response to Catherine Besteman’s “Representing Violence and ‘Othering’ 
Somalia.” Cultural anthropology 13(1),105; Hagmann, Tobias. 2005. “Review: From State Collapse to Duty-Free Shop: Somalia’s Path to 
Modernity.” African Affairs 104(416): 525-535; de Waal 2015.
35        Somalia’s Politics: The Usual Business?
A critical phase in the politicisation and militarisation of clan-based identities occurred however 
during the period 1987-92, as argued by de Waal, where war and violence served to primordialize 
identities, associated grievances and narratives of hate. The development of the 4.5 clan formula 
emerged out of this war environment and has informed subsequent processes of state-building. 
Business, clan and Islam 
Understanding trade and business in the Somali environment further illustrates the role of as well as 
alternatives to clan as a mediating system and an explanatory factor. Elliot and Carrier have explored 
the notion of trust in Somali economic life and discuss trust in relation to three arenas: clan, outside/
extra-clan and Islam.125 Trust is a critical feature of economic relations, particularly so in contexts 
such as Somalia where formal legal regulation as well as formal institutions that provide access to 
credit and capital are limited. Given this context, the lineage system operates both as an information 
network as well as a form of financial guarantee; an individual may break an informal agreement or 
run off with money, but membership of the same lineage family enables a person to use elders as a 
means to apply social pressure for recompense. 
The Somali hawala or money transfer system, for example, is strongly rooted in networks of trust 
based on lineage relations. However, as Lindley has argued, while lineage has and still provides an 
important regulating mechanism, many of the money transfer organisations (MTOs) have moved 
beyond these affiliations, as they have expanded their businesses domestically, regionally and glob-
ally.126
Islamic identity and norms play a crucial role in economic life and has in part intensified by the need 
to overcome the more divisive, competitive aspects of the clan system. A more overt Islamic identity 
in business has played an important role in developing and extending business relations into the 
Gulf, which has accelerated over the last 10-20 years. Engendering trust is a major aspect of this 
shift and, furthermore, is associated with a more conservative Islam, where the influence of Salafist 
networks has become more pervasive in economic life.127 
The confluence of Islam and business into new forms of governance or public authority coalesced 
on many occasions during the 1990s and 2000s, through the local Islamic or Shari’a courts that 
appeared (and often again disappeared) in Mogadishu and other areas of southern Somalia. These 
episodes of confluence led to the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006, and its short-
lived hegemony over much of southern and central Somalia, and which has since morphed into a 
more radical form through Al-Shabaab. The different iterations of Islamic courts – and political Islam 
– have consistently been challenged by the salience of lineage norms.128 
While clan and Islam both play major roles in the framing and organisation of politics, society and 
the economy, trust and economic relations do also develop outside these moral frameworks and 
norms. Carrier, in his exploration of business in the Somali populated Eastleigh area of Nairobi, 
emphasises that trust is not a given (through mutual clan or Islamic association) but must be 
maintained and co-produced; in other words where, for example, lineage provides an organising 
system, acts of entrustment themselves generate trust and occur across many different types of 
business relationship, including outside Somali and Islamic norms and networks. 
Clan as a regulating structure in peace making 
Somali customary norms act as the major regulatory mechanism for mitigating conflict and building 
peace. Based on his understanding of pastoral society, Lewis noted that conflict was always close 
by based on ecological pressures and competition for natural resources, but that Somali society 
had evolved institutions and mechanisms for managing this.129 Lineage elders play a crucial role in 
125  Carrier, Neil and Hannah Elliot. 2018. “Entrust we must: the role of ‘trust’ in Somali economic life.” DIIS Working Paper.
126  Lindley, A. 2010. The Early Morning Phone Call: Somali Refugees’ Remittances, New York: Berghahn Books.
127  Carrier and Elliot 2018.
128  Hoehne (forthcoming), “From stateless political order to militant Islamism in Somalia:
Thoughts on the resilience of Al Shabaab”, Conflict Research Programme Research Memo, LSE.
129  Lewis, Ioan. 1961. A Pastoral Democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among the northern Somali if the Horn of Africa, Lon-
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such processes as mediators, negotiators and peacemakers, with the underlying aim of restoring 
balance in social relations. The authority of elders has been undermined and challenged over time 
including by the different periods of government, warlords, Islamist groups and others, however, 
such mechanisms remain part of conflict mitigation and peacemaking processes. 
There is a rich documentation of peace processes across the Somali territories, that include major 
reconciliation and ‘state-building’ initiatives such as those behind the formation of Somaliland and 
Puntland, as well as many much more locally-based dispute settlement processes.130 Many of these 
cases illustrate the importance of a process-oriented incremental approach leading to the agreement 
and consensus-based decision-making; the need for inclusivity to bring in all stakeholders including 
women, youth, businessmen, media, and religious leaders as well as ‘spoilers; an orientation of 
social reconciliation as an end goal; and respected leadership in the committees that oversee the 
management of the process. What emerges as critical is the principle of collective responsibility 
for the conflict, highlighting how more successful processes involve community contribution to 
financing and logistics of the process, including from the business and diaspora communities. 
Customary and Shari’a law provide a moral and legal framework for dialogue, decision-making and 
settling grievances, with lineage elders playing a crucial role as negotiators, facilitators or mediators; 
though it is important to note that ‘elder’ in Somali society is a fluid notion as elders may be drawn 
from different walks of life; businessmen, NGO employees and Government officials may also be 
classified as elders.131 
Peacemaking and state-building at the Puntland-Galmudug border132 
Historically, there has been limited meaningful reconciliation or institution building in southern 
Somalia, but the Galkaio ‘local’ agreement, serves as an important counterexample. The Galkaio 
‘local’ agreement, signed in December 2017 and still holding in early 2021, is a peacemaking process 
that engaged external mediators who worked with clan leaders and other local actors to come to 
an agreement. Two key dynamics of this process stand out: first that it was able to create space for 
public dialogue that Kapteijns argues without, would forever limit forgiveness and reconciliation.133 
Second, while it sought to address traditional conflict drivers, it has also been able to weather the 
dynamics, actors, and conflict drivers introduced by the creation of a new federal system.
Galkaio town marks a border at multiple levels, between two of the four major Somali clan families, 
the Darod and the Hawiye, as well as between two of their powerful local lineages, the Reer Mahad 
and Sa’ad. It also marks the border between the more stable northern Somalia and the volatile centre 
and south. The 1993 Mudug (Peace) Accord effectively separated northern Somalia from the centre 
and south of the country, during the civil war, enabling the area now known as Puntland to pursue 
a reconciliation process which concluded with its inauguration in 1998. This Accord mitigated the 
threat of large-scale conflict for over 20 years although is best characterised as a truce or ceasefire 
as it did not involve a deeper reconciliation process between the divided communities.134 The 
border comprised a physical barrier with guarded checkpoints but is also imbued with social and 
psychological dimensions, reflecting the troubled history of the area and its unreconciled character, 
which continued to be animated by public and social media.135 While trade continued across the 
border, other forms of social interaction, such as inter-marriage and everyday social intercourse had 
all but stopped. 
don: IAI; Bradbury, Mark and Sally Healy. 2010. “Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking.” Issue 
21. Accord, Conciliation Resources in collaboration with Interpeace.
130  Bradbury, Mark. 2008. “A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study.” ed. Pat Johnson, Interpeace, the Academy for Peace and 
Development, the Center for Research and Dialogue, and the Puntland Development Research Center; Bradbury and Healy 2010.
131  Ibid
132  This section draws on CRP research: Theros and Majid 2021. On the Galkaio ‘local’ agreement, see Theros, Marika and Nisar 
Majid, with Khalif Abdirahman, 2020. “Finding Peace in Somalia: the Gallkaio ‘local’ Peace Agreement.” Conflict Research Programme, 
London School of Economics 4 November. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107142/.
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The conflict and agreement-making process in Galkaio took place between 2014 and 2017 and 
coincides with the emergence of the Federal system in Somalia. This political arrangement required 
the creation of new FMSs, Galmudug, as an amalgamation of Galgadud and southern Mudug regions, 
while Puntland was fully incorporated into the federal arrangement as a pre-existing polity. The 
agreement to form and recognise Galmudug antagonised the Puntland leadership, who removed 
their MPs from Parliament in Mogadishu in response. One of the major underlying rationales for this 
reaction was that the incumbent President of Puntland, Abdiwali Gaas (and his allies), feared that 
the close relationship between Somalia’s national President, Hassan Sheikh, and the first Galmudug 
President, Abdikarim Guled, might influence the next Federal election, due in early 2017.136 Such 
tensions between central and regional actors include a recognition that Somalia’s political elite act 
and circulate within a political marketplace that links the regional and national levels.137 Puntland’s 
own elections, due in 2018, added to the tensions as opposition figures portrayed President Abdiwali 
as a weak diaspora leader unable to defend their territory. 
Following two major outbreaks of conflict and two ceasefire agreements, a more substantial process 
started to take place, through a Joint Ceasefire Committee and an informal network of peace 
activists, that involved multiple actors, including important roles for the UN and Interpeace. Building 
trust between the main protagonists required firstly that political actors in Galmudug demonstrate 
a willingness and ability to engage in meaningful talks and secondly, for Puntland’s political elite to 
recognise this change and respond. A prominent elder from south Galkaio explained, 
‘As I said before, I had to build confidence. By this time, Puntland saw that I was serious 
about peace. They admitted to me that they never thought that I will be that serious about 
peace, accepting all the faults on their side and showing a lot of confidence in my resolve to 
achieve peace. I put a lot of pressure on commanders and politicians. I went to the militias 
on both sides to convince them of peace. Things started to improve.’ 
Re-establishing social relations meant re-establishing xeer. This, however, had to be done 
incrementally. Membership of the Joint Ceasefire Committee included elders from all of the clans 
living in Galkaio. The payment of ‘diya’ – blood money – is one of the constituent elements of xeer. 
As part of the ceasefire agreement the elders agreed that any deaths or injuries would thereafter be 
due compensation. However, the elders decided to personally guarantee these payments as they 
could not guarantee clan-wide contributions at this early stage. The elders were not the only local 
actors pursuing peace as local youth groups in Galkaio town as well as some prominent women and 
businesspeople were also involved.138 
The act of physically bringing together protagonists, from military groups as well as the wider 
population across both sides the border, was a critical aspect of the agreement making process. 
Neutral venues had to identified and secured as neither side was comfortable meeting within 
another’s territory due to the prevalence of revenge killings that had been taking place and general 
environment of tension and uncertainty. Rebuilding social relations took place through other forms 
of organized social interaction. Prominent women and youth groups active in the town played a 
particularly important role in bring people together. International Women’s Day took place on the 
8th March in 2017, and a celebratory event involving 50 women from either side of the border was 
organised. A football match was another event that was organised to bring young men together from 
either side of the border. 
Another important dimension of this process was addressing the propagation of hate speech in 
the Somali media. Somalis are major consumers of the media, through local radio, websites and 
social media is associated with a high level of clan partisanship.139 During this period, local radio 
stations in particular were playing propagating hate speech enflaming tensions. The authorities of 
136  ICG. 2015. “Galkayo and its dangerous faultlines, Commentary”. https://staging.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/
galkayo-and-somalia-s-dangerous-faultlines
137  de Waal 2015. 
138  Opinions vary locally on the relative importance of different actors.
139  Isse Salwa 2006.
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both Puntland and Galmudug agreed to ban hate speech on local radio stations thereby helping to 
reduce tensions. 
The 2017 Galkaio agreement therefore marks an important counter-example to the more dominant 
characteristics of the political marketplace under the current Federal system. It remains a fragile 
and unfinished process but it is also the case that there have been further political developments in 
Galmudug that require further analysis as to their significance and sustainability.140 
Justice and security in Kismayo141
The absence of a credible and functional government since the late 1980s has been felt particularly 
strongly in the arena of the rule of law. Under Siad Barre, the judicial system was resented for being 
corrupt, politically manipulated, and for rejecting Islamic precepts—and many welcomed its demise. 
It was perhaps inevitable that in the absence of a system of state courts that Islamic law and courts 
would emerge. As Muslims, Somalis were able to call upon a well-formed body of jurisprudence 
and practice, that enjoyed social legitimacy and historically validated practices, to establish courts. 
Islamic law has a particular advantage in this regard in that it encompasses a penal code, a civil 
code, and commercial and tax codes. All of these are essential for the conduct of everyday life. 
A credible justice sector is a vital part of governance and can act as a constraining factor on the abuses 
of authority and manipulation of the marketplace. The limitations and failures of the Somali formal 
justice system in this regard are profoundly important and contribute to the continued credibility, 
persistence and power of Al-Shabaab. Recent analyses continue to highlight the politicisation of the 
arms of the judiciary and the underlying political economy within this sector.142  
In southern Somalia, over the last 20-30 years, arguably the most effective forms of public authority 
and governance have come through the episodic instances of Islamic courts, which have had both 
local and ‘national’ reach and worked to limit the excesses of clan dominance and ‘warlordism’ and 
impose an order (see fig x for example). The case of Kismayo provides an example of an aligning of 
interests in the justice and security area, with both continuities from the logic of the Islamic Courts, 
as well as adaptations to the current federal system.143 
Kismayo is the main city and de facto capital of Jubbaland. For much of the last thirty years Kismayo 
has had a volatile and violent history ruled over by warlord figures renowned for its complexity 
and ‘most feared warlords’.144 The current President and ‘Big Man’ of Jubbaland, President Ahmed 
Madobe, has had a long history in Kismayo, originally as the Governor of the town for some months 
under the Islamic Courts Union, in 2006, and later, from 2010/11, as the interim and the official 
president, having re-captured the town from Al-Shabaab (with the support of Kenyan troops). He 
remains as President following the discredited election of 2019 (see Section 8 below). 
One of the defining features of Kismayo has been the relative success of Madobe’s intelligence and 
security apparatus which has kept Kismayo relatively peaceful, with limited criminality and where Al-
Shabaab have limited reach. Menkhaus states that Kismayo’s relative security is ‘mainly attributed 
to the effectiveness of the Jubaland State’s security sector, most notably the intelligence branch, 
JISA, which monitors the city and its population more robustly than arguably any other local armed 
authority in Somalia except Al-Shabaab’.145 He adds that ‘the fact that the Jubbaland authorities 
have made the city open to all former residents, from a variety of previously quarrelling clans, has 
140  These have included the Hobyo Conference, further inter-clan agreements and the hosting of the electoral talks in Dhusamareb 
(see SaferWorld 2020). 
141  This topic draws on CRP research in the justice sector, which included over 200 observations in the district court in Kismayo as 
well as in-depth research. For more on this, see https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/projects/conflict-research-programme/Somalia . 
142  HIPS 2020; Gundel et al. 2016.
143  The CRP has conducted research in Kismayo and Mogadishu over the last 2-3 years, primarily through court observations in both 
cities as well as associated qualitative research.
144  Hatchet, J. 2013. “Talking Tactics: Kismayo, Somalia”. Humanitarian Practice Network, ODI: London. Talking tactics: Kismayo, 
Somalia - Humanitarian Practice Network (odihpn.org)
145  Menkhaus, K. 2017. Dadaab Returnee Conflict Assessment, Report prepared for Danish Demining Group, 20-21. 
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reduced the risk of clan-based clashes over the city for the time being.’146 This observation is worth 
emphasising, as Madobe does not seek the clan dominance of urban space or territory that is typical 
in much of the country and defines conflict fault-lines in other FMSs.147 Madobe’s background with 
the ICU (and Al-Shabaab) helps to explain this position as well as his success in managing security 
and intelligence and support for a credible justice sector. 
The formal organisation of the justice system in Kismayo is consistent with the governmental system, 
with a court of first instance (the district court), a regional court (not merged), and an Appeals/High 
court.148 Following recognition of corruption and a poor reputation within the Kismayo court system, 
reforms were undertaken in early 2018, driven by the new Minister of Justice, Constitution and 
Religious Affairs at the time, as well as the president. Their rationale was to change the reputation 
of the courts, and to do so they brought into the district courts locally respected sheikhs, who were 
practicing and popular in the town, and familiar with both Sharia’a law and Somali law. 
The district court operates in coordination with an Elders Committee, with wide representation, which 
serves as a representative body to deal with disputes, using customary law, if they are not resolved 
through lower levels of the customary system. Over the last two years, a special land committee has 
been established in order to deal with larger, complex and sensitive land cases. This committee has 
a special police unit attached to it, to assist with enforcement.
The district court primarily deals with civil cases, which are predominantly family disputes, accidents 
and injuries, and land disputes. Some murder/manslaughter cases and rape cases also reached 
this court. Observations taken in the courts found that cases are dealt with swiftly (including being 
recalled within days when further evidence or investigation is required), are low cost, are attended 
by many different identity groups and where outcomes/judgements do not reflect biases due to 
identity, wealth or power. The court premises themselves are informal and easily accessed. These 
characteristics contrast markedly with Mogadishu and other areas of the country. The police force 
in Kismayo town does remain problematic and has not been subject to the same level of reform as 
the court system itself.149 However, the overall environment of stability and security suggest that 
the capacity of the police – through corruption, interference and incompetence – to undermine the 
justice processes in the town is limited, particularly in comparison to other urban centres under 
Government control, including Mogadishu.
Transnational citizenship and resistance150
Resistance to the logic of the political marketplace, alongside resisting violence and the 
instrumentalization of identities, is evident in Somalia through individuals and networks. Across the 
CRP, instances or processes of ‘civicness’ have been identified and explored in this light; civicnesss 
refers to the ‘meanings and practices that sustain integrity, trust, civility, inclusion and dialogue, and 
non-violence.’151 Types of civicness include direct activism and protests, the behaviour of officials 
and citizens and the creation of safe spaces in conflict environments.152 The notion of civicness is 
contrasted with the idea of civil society, which has been criticised for having largely been taken over 
by ‘NGO-ism’ and therein subject to international agendas and resources. Key actors – mediators 
and peacemakers – in the Galkaio agreement process described above, could be described in terms 
of qualities of civicness. 
Transnational/transborder political engagement is a profound feature of the Somali environment, as 
it is of many conflict settings. Lyons and Mandaville explain that, while processes of globalisation and 
146  Ibid. 
147  This position leads to pressure from many in his own clan, who criticise Madobe for not enabling a greater clan hegemony. 
148  The district and regional court were merged in year 2018.
149  This is recognised by some leadership figures in Kismayo.
150  This section draws on Majid 2021 (forthcoming).
151  Kaldor 2019. 
152  Kaldor, M. de Waal, A., and Radice, H. 2020. Evidence from the Conflict Research Programme, submission to the Integrated Review 
of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, London: London School of Economics and Political Science. http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/106522/3/Integrated_Review_evidence_from_the_CRP.PDF. 
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transnationalisation are pervasive today, the political agency of such populations remain ‘intensely 
focused on specific locations, nations, identities and issues.’153 Moreover, migrant and transmigrant 
populations are described as a social force ‘reshaping the workings of legal domains in more than 
one state.’154 This perspective is consistent with Lund’s notion that the state is ‘always in the making’ 
and that citizenship provides a point of entry for analysing the ongoing relationship between the 
state (or other forms of public authority) and society.155
Somalia is very clearly an example of a ‘transnational state’, with Hoehne arguing that the Somali 
diaspora and their remittances are constitutive of a ‘state-logic’ that ‘focuses on fixed territories, 
boundaries, and social and economic exclusion’, and that are constitutive of bottom-up processes 
of state-making in the Somali territories.156 While transnational/transborder political agency helps 
to explain many conflicts and the political marketplace itself, in Somalia, and often follows the 
contours of the politicisation of identities, a transnational space also enables more civic and inclusive 
expressions and activities to be pursued, away from the direct risks and threats of violence. Majid 
provides a selection of vignettes drawn from two individual life histories, illustrating these processes 
one of which is presented below.157 
Following the life histories of two Somali men, through their local and transnational/transborder 
actions, Majid identifies multiple examples of resistance to practices of exclusion, the politicisation/
mobilisation of (clan-) identities and the creation of platforms for dialogue and conflict mitigation. 
These practices take place in diaspora locations as well as through transnational networks, and 
involve different technologies, organisations and platforms. One such example involved participation 
in a high-level political network that attempted to mediate between the FGS and the Jubbaland 
authority in the build-up to the elections in 2019, where the risk of violence was increasing. Both 
actors have been – and are – active in Somali circles as well as through international agencies and 
networks, in different types of initiatives, but that together express a form of civicness. Their actions 
include both successes and failures and can be understood in terms of a transborder citizenship. 
Transborder citizenship is understood as an extension of the national construction of rights and 
political inclusion; citizenship concerns both rights and claims and has legal-bureacratic dimensions 
as well as social and cultural forms. Social citizenship for example involves claims ‘… to citizenship 
substantively through social practice rather than law.’158 Citizenship is a complex notion and involves 
rights as well as political participation. Rights have to be claimed through participation and … Fox 
further argues that rights and empowerment can each encourage the other; ‘some must act like 
citizens (claim rights) so that other can actually be citizens (have rights).’159
The lasting point here is that while the transnational nature of the Somali state has been linked to the 
further entrenchment of the political marketplace dynamics, a transnational political engagement 
is also constitutive of a civic space that provides an alternative or counter to political marketplace 
dynamics. Examples offered by Majid provide evidence in relation to conflict mitigation, accountability 
to human rights abuses and the promotion of dialogue. 
153  Lyons, T. and Mandaville, P. 2012. “Introduction: Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks.” in Lyons, T. and Man-
daville, P. (eds.) Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks, 1-23, London: Hurst and Company. 2. 
154  Glick Schiller, N. 2005. Transborder citizenship: an outcome of legal pluralism within transnational social fields. In F. v. Ben-
da-Beckmann, K. v. Benda-Beckmann, & A. Griffiths (Eds.), Mobile people, mobile law: expanding legal relations in a contracting world. 
27-49. Aldershot: Ashgate, 48.
155  Lund, C. 2016. “Rule and Rupture: State Formation through the Production of Property and Citizenship.” Development and Change 
47 (6): 1199–1228. International Institute of Social Studies.
156  Hoehne, Markus. 2016. “The rupture of territoriality and the diminishing relevance of cross‐cutting ties in Somalia after 1990.” De-
velopment and Change 47(6):1380. 
157  Majid 2021 (forthcoming). 
158  Glick Schiller 2005, 55
159  Ibid, 176. 
41        Somalia’s Politics: The Usual Business?
7. (Formal) Political Institutions and the Regional Elections
The following section provides a summary of political marketplace dynamics focused around the 
regional elections that took place across all Member States between 2018 and 2020. 160 These 
elections all took place under the Farmajo-led central government and therefore reflect both sub-
national/local as well as centre-periphery dynamics during this particular iteration of the federal 
system, where the FGS – through the Farmajo-Fahad-Khaire cabal161 – were attempting to install 
compliant leaders in the members states. 
South West State (November 2018) 
The incumbent SWS President at this time, Sharif Hassan, was instrumental in the creation of 
this state. Hassan was already a wealthy businessman and successful politician, in Baidoa and 
Mogadishu, prior to his election as SWS President. He is considered a skilled political operator and 
referred to as a ‘kingmaker’ by many. He is also widely acknowledged for corruption and personally 
managing the State budget in order to feed his patronage networks within the SWS. His election 
as the first SWS President was in part enabled by the good personal relations he had with Hassan 
Sheikh Mohamoud’s camp. 
Views on his Presidency are varied. He is credited with managing inter-clan competition within the 
Digil and Mirifle quite well, whereas others point out that he marginalized groups such as the Bantu 
and Bimaal. Some of these different perspectives reflect the division of SWS between Barawe (the 
official capital, on the coast) and the de fact capital, Baidoa; different identity groups are found in 
Lower Shabelle (around Baraawe – particularly the Digil and Somali Bantu), whereas the Mirifle (or 
Rahanweyn) are the dominant group in the hinterland, and Baidoa. Hassan is himself from the Ashraf 
clan but has strong links to the Leysan and Mourasade, through two of his marriages. The Leysan are 
one of the two main sub-clans of the Rahanwyen, that contest Baidoa town; and are one of the more 
powerful military and business communities within Baidoa and within the Rahanweyn.
The SWS, economically speaking, is renowned for its agricultural base, accounting for the most 
productive rainfed and irrigated land, including significant export commodities. Much of the more 
productive and lucrative land has been the target of predatory groups over time, with the profits 
accruing to few people, mostly not indigenous where the majority of the population are small-scale 
farmers and agro-pastoralists. Baidoa town is an important trade hub, linked to Mogadishu as well 
as to Kenya and local markets within the region. The agricultural basis of this state is also reflected 
in the marginalization of the Digil and Mirifle, who are referred to historically as second class citizens 
within the Somali social hierarchy.162 An indicator of this is the relatively small diaspora and business 
communities from within this clan family, reflecting unequal access to education, migration and 
economic opportunities historically and under the Barre regime. The military capacity of clan-based 
militias are also limited as a result. 
Political finance to local elites comes from taxation of trade, rents from the aid economy, business 
ownership and the state budget from Mogadishu. Sharif Hassan clearly benefitted from many of 
these factors although he is exceptional in in terms of his wealth, where the financial capacity held 
by actors from this region cannot compete with the wider business-political elite. This lowers the 
cost of loyalty in the political marketplace as illustrated below. The adoption of the 4.5 formula 
has symbolically changed the political status of the Digil and Mirifle, and the political importance 
to the national Presidency is seen through the large number of MPs from this group in the Federal 
Parliament. Controlling these MPs is therefore an important part of national and regional political 
calculations. 
Given this background, competition for the State elections was led by three main protagonists, 
the incumbent Sharif Hassan, the ex-Al-Shabaab leader Abu Mansur Robow and the preferred FFK 
candidate, Laftagreen. The political dynamics leading up to the November 2018 election were largely 
160  This section is based on sub-national memos produced by the CRP for each of the FMSs as well as ongoing monitoring captured 
in the CRP quarterly updates. 
161  Prime Minister Hassan Khaire was impeached and resigned 3 months before the Hirshabelle election. 
162  Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds.) 2000. The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: the War behind the War, Colorado/London: 
Westview Press/HAAN Publishing.
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orchestrated by the FGS, reflecting the unequal financial and coercive power of the FGS and its 
Ethiopian ally.163 This took place in two stages. The first was to force the withdrawal of Sharif Hassan, 
who represented a threat to the FFK, given his close links with previous Federal President, Hassan 
Sheikh Mohamoud, who was expected to contest the 2010/11 federal elections, and political skill 
and resources. This happened through intimidation and the exchange of several million dollars. The 
Ethiopian military has long maintained forces in Baidoa town and the alliance between Ethiopia and 
the FGS, along with a large financial pay-off, provided the necessary encouragement for Hassan to 
withdraw his candidacy.
The second step was the removal of Abu Mansur Robow. The ex-Al Shabab leader was the running 
favourite in the lead up to the elections.164 Robow is from the influential Leysan clan with a loyal 
clan militia. He is thought to have had some financial support from business allies (through his 
Islamist networks) as well as from the diaspora. He was considered widely popular within the wider 
population. He reportedly refused a large financial pay-off and was duly arrested by Ethiopian forces 
acting on behalf of the FGS prior to the election itself. 
The FFK acted in coordination with local elites in SWS, particularly from the Harin clan, the main 
competitor of the Leysan in Baidoa, some of whom were threatened by a potential Robow victory. 
The election of their preferred candidate, Laftagreen, was then relatively smooth and obtained by 
modest cash payments to the State MPs, reflecting the relatively low financial basis and lack of 
competition. 
The arrest of Robow and blatant intervention of Ethiopian forces on behalf of the FFK led to 
demonstrations and a reported 15 deaths, which in turn led to critical statements by the UN SRSG 
(although mixed responses across the international community), and in turn his being made Persona 
Non Grata. In political marketplace terms this election clearly demonstrated the superior financial 
and military resources of the FFK vis-à-vis SWS. The international community’s relative silence and 
mixed responses, while Farmajo was in the earlier period of his Presidency, arguably signalled to 
Farmajo that there would be some tolerance for such a strategy. 
Puntland (December/January 2019) 
The Puntland election took place soon after that in SWS. Puntland, is an established polity with 
pre-existing norms; power-sharing takes place through an unwritten agreement that the Presidency 
rotates between three lineages of the Mijerteen-Mohamed Saleban clan, the Osman Mohamoud, 
Isse Mohamoud and Omar Mohamoud.165 The 2019 election was the turn of the Osman Mohamoud, 
who dominated the initial list of Presidential candidates. Clan elders from the Mijerteen remain a 
credible and powerful force within Puntland and act as a mediating element where abuses of power 
or norms are considered excessive and to mitigate the risk of conflict. 
Puntland has a long-established trading economy based around the port of Bosasso and the 
tarmacked road that runs south to central and southern Somalia, which together acted as vital 
channels for trade to/from southern and central regions for many years following the civil war. 166 As 
a result, Puntland has a well-established business elite, who provide political finance to competing 
candidates. Puntland elites also generate political finance from aid contracts and security rents 
(the UAE and the USA support military forces and bases, for anti-piracy and counter-terrorism) and 
fishing licenses.167 
163  Baidoa town has long held Ethiopian troops and is considered within Ethiopia’s buffer area. Ethiopian troops helped create and 
support the RRA (Rahanweyn Resistance Army) in 1997 and helped oust the occupying forces of Hussein Aideed. 
164  Crisis Group 2018.
165  See Marchal 2010. “The Puntland State of Somalia: A Tentative Social Analysis.“ 
166  This has been a critical artery for imports and exports to Somalia since the civil war and has only lost some of its importance 
over the last 5-10 years as investment and the containerisation of Mogadishu has taken place. However, security and transport con-
straints in southern Somalia mean that an estimated 80% of goods that arrive in Belet Weyn come from Bosasso rather than the much 
closer Mogadishu. 
167  See Majid and Abdirahman 2019 for Somalia-Yemen fishing links. 
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Three sets of actors competed in these elections; the incumbent, President Abdiwali Mohamed Ali 
Gaas, backed by the UAE (and the power/resources from his office); two candidates supported by the 
FFK in Mogadishu; two candidates, including the eventual winner, Said Abdullahi (Deni), supported 
by the business group known as Aaran Jaan. 
The incumbent President, Abdiwali attempted to manipulate the election vetting committee, the 
security apparatus and other means to restrict competition in his bid for re-election, however, he was 
unable to do this, due in large part to the influence of clan elders in Garowe, who guaranteed security 
and an open election in order to enable the rotation of power. Abdiwali had limited support following 
his period of Presidency and was considered unlikely to win, in the end failing to get past the first 
round of voting. 
The FFK candidates brought considerable money to the table in order to buy support. An estimated 
US$15m dollars changed hands in the week prior to the election, with all candidates using money to 
buy support, an extremely high figure outside of Federal elections. President Deni, an independently 
wealthy businessman and previously an MP in the Federal government, narrowly won the election 
and represented an alliance of two clan-based interest groups, the Isse Mohamoud (considered the 
dominant group within the Aaran Jaan) and the Osman Mohamoud.168 
The election was considered open, competitive and fair in the Somali context, with significant 
amounts of money changing hands. There was no possibility of the FFK resorting to intimidation 
or violence in Puntland as they neither had the means nor the credibility locally to do so. All parties 
(with the exception of the incumbent president) respected the rotation of power inherent within 
Puntland, which only applies to the Mohamed Saleban.
Jubbaland (August 2019) 
The Jubbaland election took place against the background of the SWS and Puntland elections, with 
the incumbent President, Ahmed Madobe, positioned in opposition to the Federal President, Farmajo. 
This juxtaposition represented not only a centre-periphery tension, where the FFK were clearly 
attempting to influence FMS elections in their favour, but also the main fissure within Jubbaland of 
competing identity groups—the Ogaden and Marehan. In the weeks and months prior to the election, 
Madobe and his allies instrumentalised an Ogaden identity to oppose Farmajo; a pan-Ogaden, 
transnational/transborder identity incorporating Ogaden populations in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and 
the diaspora had been instrumental in Madobe’s first election victory.169 
Madobe’s political budget was derived from the taxation reserves he had accumulated through 
Kismayo port, as well as additional finances provided from Kenya and the UAE. 170 Kenyan interests 
are considerable in Jubbaland and Kismayo, and have included profits from illicit trade – imports 
and exports through Kismayo, to the Kenyan border – as well as Madobe’s value as leverage over 
the FGS on the maritime dispute between the two countries. In addition, Madobe has a significant 
coercive capacity through his Ras Kamboni militia, which comprise a well-trained and well-funded 
group with considerable battle experience, and a strong intelligence capacity. Abdi Rashid ‘Janaan’, 
the ex-Security Minister of Jubbaland, and strongman of Gedo, is a key ally of Madobe. He represents 
a Marehan identity in the Jubbaland political project. Janaan has a significant militia and political 
budget from his control of cross-border trade and international aid. Madobe is also thought to have 
received financial support from ex-President Abdi ‘Iley’ of Somali Regional State, Ethiopia, prior to 
his arrest. 
As political posturing developed prior to the elections in Jubbaland, Farmajo ultimately changed 
tack, financially supporting other Ogaden candidates, thereby reducing the weight of politicised clan 
narratives. Madobe’s close circles latterly realised they were unlikely or at least uncertain to win an 
168  Within the Osman Mohamoud, one lineage provided most of his financial support. Evidence of business interests materialized 
later in 2019 as President Deni attempted to take over a lucrative logistics contract with the UAE (to benefit Aran Jaan), held by the rival 
Puntland Development Group. This created considerable tensions which clan elders had to intervene in to calm down, forcing President 
Deni to back down. 
169  See Majid and Abdirahman 2021.
170  It is not clear whether UAE money comes directly or via Kenya. Kenya has been supplying the Jubbaland administration with 
money for some years as part of its arrangements there.
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open, competitive election, as they had neither the financial resources to compete with Mogadishu-
supported candidates or the support of sufficient MPs in their own Parliament. Instead, Madobe 
carefully orchestrated the parliamentary selection process: the Jubbaland Independent Electoral 
and Border Commission (JIBEC) was selected by the President’s camp and imposed various criteria 
to limit registration; the election process – election of MPs, who then elect the President – was 
held in a location secured by the President and took place within a one-week period, both of which 
minimized external interference and maximized internal manipulation. Each of the voting MPs were 
given US$10,000, and 56 out of the 75 votes went to the incumbent President. This relatively low 
financial cost reflects Madobe’s control of the political marketplace keeping the cost of loyalty 
relatively low. An attempt by the FFK to use Ethiopian forces to intervene militarily was resisted by 
Madobe with the support of Kenyan forces. 
Galmudug (January 2020) 
Following the failure of the FGS to oust Madobe in mid-2019 and having failed to install a compliant 
figure in Puntland, Galmudug became the next and a crucial state for the FFK, where a win was 
essential in order to maintain political credibility in advance of the approaching federal elections. 
Galmudug also plays a unique role in Somali national politics, with many of the political elite 
originating in the region. 
Unlike other regions, the state’s political economy (and marketplace) is cash poor compared to 
other Federal Member States, as Galmudug has few natural resources or commercial assets. Its 
port of Hobyo, for example, is in the third tier, far below Mogadishu, Bosasso, and Kismayo in terms 
of capacity and profitability. The individual (rather than collective) wealth of competing clans and 
political elites, and circulation of piracy money, obscures the cost of loyalties within the marketplace 
where Galmudug remains the backstage of national contests in Mogadishu. These dynamics 
contribute to a fragmented security arena, where neither a single dominant political-military firm (as 
in Jubbaland) nor a stable political dispensation (as in Puntland) exists.
Galmudug represents a Habar Gedir political project, although where considerable divisions exist 
within the Habar Gedir and where other sub-clans (including the Dir and Marehan) are also important. 
Political leaders hailing from the dominant clans represented in this region continue to wield the 
legacy of overthrowing Siad Barre to push forward ambitions in national politics. In the absence of 
any elite pact at the regional and federal level, coalitions and alliances are fluid, unpredictable and 
destabilising. The electoral contestation revolves around, on the one hand, the allocation of seats 
at the regional and federal level – how the regional presidency, vice-presidency and speakership 
will be allocated along clan/sub-clans in accordance with distribution of key seats at the federal 
cabinet level. At the same time, opposition leadership in Mogadishu seek alliances with Galmudug’s 
parliamentary representatives in order to unseat the ruling group. 
Ultimately, the FGS were able to strongarm the electoral process, employing the SNA (relatively easy 
to mobilise from nearby Mogadishu) and Ethiopian military support to restrict access to opposition 
figures and elders. The FGS were also able to disarm Ahla Sunna Wa Jama using financial incentives, 
and as the group had already lost their Ethiopian patron. Ahmed Abdi Kariye (‘QoorQoor’, a state 
minister at the time) was installed as President. He is a former warlord and lieutenant in the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU). 
As indicated in Section 6, while the election followed a political marketplace logic, with the FGS 
able to insert a compliant candidate, Galmudug has seen a number of reconciliatory processes 
take place since 2017, including the Galkaio Peace Agreement presented previously, the Hobyo 
Conference, recent inter-clan agreements and the hosting of the 2020 Dhusamareb federal election 
talks. The extent to which these are far-reaching social and political changes or re-positioning in the 
political marketplace (or both), remains unclear. However, although business, political and military 
elites from Galmudug are wealthy and powerful, they face some pressure to look inward to a home 
region that has languished. 
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Hirshabelle (November 2020) 
The Hirshabelle election was initially delayed by the discussions around the federal election process 
(known as Dhusamareb 1, 2 and 3, held in mid-2020). The election eventually took place in late 2020 
and proceeded relatively smoothly due to the alignment of interests between the Federal Government, 
and the majority of local clans and interests in the region, with the Hawadle (the losing party). 
The FMS of Hirshabelle consists of a power-sharing arrangement between the Hawadle and the Abgal, 
with the Gaalje’el representing a significant third force, all of whom are Hawiye clans.171 The most 
powerful militias in the state come from within these clans. Hirshabelle was initially negotiated and 
created on the basis that Johar became the capital (appeasing Abgal interests), the Presidency went 
to the Hawadle and the Speaker of Parliament to the Gaalje’el; this is reflected in the Parliamentary 
seats.172 
Members of the Hawadle and Abgal have powerful political and business elites in the country as 
well as large diaspora populations. Belet Weyn and Johar towns are major trading hubs and the 
two single largest sources of taxation revenue within the region, under the control of elements from 
these two main clans. Hawadle and Abgal interests also obtain significant aid and security rents 
from Belet Weyn and Johar respectively. Political finance for potential candidates comes from these 
sources as well as the monthly payments that the FGS makes to each FMS, ostensibly for the running 
of the state government. Political finance can also be raised from diaspora and business sources. 
Hirshabelle has remained extremely fragile, fragmented and dysfunctional since its formation, with 
considerable internal tensions, along lineage lines. The presence and influence of Al-Shabaab in 
Hirshabelle is considered extremely high. 
In the Hirshabelle elections there was a general alignment of Federal and State interests concerning 
the election of the MPs, the President and other senior positions. The Hawadle (who held the 
presidency since the creation of the state) had become very unpopular in the preceding years, with 
significant internal fighting as well as having conflict with several other clans. All other groups 
therefore opposed a repeat of the Hawadle Presidency. Locally, the strongman of Johar, Gudwaale, 
was the favoured candidate. He was the Vice-President, an ex-governor and his militia had controlled 
Johar for over ten years. He was the favoured Abgal candidate. 
The FGS had an interest in supporting an Abgal candidate, given the powerful Abgal presence in 
Mogadishu, where two of the previous national Presidents were from the Abgal, both of whom were 
competing for the 2020/21 elections; appeasing Abgal sentiment in Hirshabelle may reduce the 
pressure for an Abgal President in Mogadishu. The FGS reportedly worked hard to ensure that the 
top five positions in the state went to its favoured candidates (the president, the vice president, 
the parliament leader and his two deputies). These five are said to have cost the government 
approximately US $1,200,2000, to secure, a modest figure for a regional election. 
There was little competition to the FGS in the political market for Hirshabelle, with the divisions 
within the Hawadle and the alignment of other interests around the Abgal Vice-President. Hawadle 
elites did not stand, thereby also keeping participation and costs in the political marketplace down. 
There were cases of coercion with some elders threated in order to support their favoured candidate, 
but these were limited. 
171  Of the 99 seats in the regional parliament, 60 members come from Hiiraan region while the remaining 39 members come from 
Middle Shabelle. The largest single clan is the Abgal represented by 14 members, followed by the Hawadle represented by 13 members 
and the Gaalje’el represented by 12 members.   
172  These three clans have the three largest number of MPs, though together comprising just under 50% of the overall number of 
seats. The Hawadle only have 13 MPs of the 99 in the state parliament. 
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8. The Somali Elections – the Political Marketplace and its 
‘Unsettledness’ 
The preceding analysis shows in devastating detail what happens to a nation when the logic of 
transactional politics—violence and money—determine the imperative of political survival, at 
the expense of any longer-term institution-building. This is the reality of state ‘failure’ and it is 
extraordinarily difficult for a country, in the current international political-economic context, to climb 
out of that situation.
The political marketplace, alongside the logics of violence and politicized identity, explain much of 
Somalia’s political predicament. The political marketplace in Somalia has evolved from Siad Barre’s 
dysfunctional kleptocracy, through periods of extreme deregulation, to the current federal system, 
which can be described as a rivalrous oligopoly. Elite competition is imperfectly regulated by the 
federal system of government and the international military and financial resources deployed, partly 
to sustain the formal governance system, and partly to pursue other objectives (counter-terror, 
counter-piracy, managing humanitarian crisis, securing security interests, etc.). External actors and 
resources thereby play key roles in shaping and financing the marketplace. The ongoing status of 
Somalia’s security sector – more accurately described as a security arena – with its multiple actors 
and shifting affiliations continues to reflect the underlying reality of decentralized coercive power in 
the country and is reflected in the multiple affiliations within the Somali National Army itself. 
Al-Shabaab remains a central component of Somalia’s political marketplace. It emerged from the 
most cogent attempt to move away from a marketized system of politics under the Union of Islamic 
Courts. Al-Shabaab was initially located in opposition to the federal system but is increasingly taking 
a more ambiguous position, both colluding with and contending against the FGS depending on 
context. The group’s capacity and reputation in the provision of justice stands in stark contrast to 
the government’s own system. 
With regard to Somalia’s current predicament, this paper has identified four key factors: a competitive 
and decentralized political market; the ongoing salience of clan units formed from the process of 
military conflict and peacemaking; the pervasive use of money and violence; and the multiple levels 
and unpredictability of a turbulent political life. An example of this is provided by the 2019 impasse 
between the FGS and Jubbaland – still unresolved in 2021-- in which Ethiopia and Kenya support 
opposing sides, clan unit affiliations are instrumentalized at local and national levels, and money and 
violence are used in pursuit of control over electoral outcomes. 
As of mid-2021 Somalia remains in an uncertain inter-regnum with an uncertain election process. The 
alliance of President Farmajo with PM Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afwerki has lent political and 
military support to the FGS, and which has played a crucial role in several of the regional elections. 
The ambition of Pres. Isaias to construct an axis of autocracy in the Horn has, however, suffered 
setbacks because of the potentially protracted war in Tigray, the difficulty of centralizing power in 
Somalia, active opposition from Kenya, and the change in administration in Washington, DC.
A large injection of political finance by an external power may well influence the eventual choice 
of President, as has happened in the previous two Presidential elections. However, with the recent 
rapprochement between Saudi Arabia (and to a lesser extent the UAE) and Qatar, this factor may well 
be less important than in the recent past. While cash remains the currency of the political marketplace 
for key positions (such as the presidency), the tactical use of cash intersects with a strong Somali 
anti-incumbency tendency meaning that the largest purse does not automatically decide the winner. 
The economic shock from Covid-19 is also playing out and has considerably reduced government 
revenue and in turn squeezed political finance and patronage, from several sources, including trade-
related taxation, remittances, as well as aid-related rents and patronage. A number of prominent 
cases of corruption around Covid-19 assistance indicate the current difficulties in obtaining political 
funds. The effects of this reduction in finance and patronage are thought to be more detrimental to 
the opposition than to the incumbent President given the greater variety of resources available at 
the centre. 
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Political positioning around the elections is being influenced by the prospects of resources 
becoming available from the oil and gas sector. If this eventually materialises it would have the 
capacity to reconfigure the structure of the political marketplace. However, this eventuality has not 
yet materialised. 
The wrangling, posturing and delays in the weeks and months leading up to – and beyond – an 
election are part and parcel of a condition of prolonged ‘unsettledness’,173 and seen in many other 
similar contexts around the world. If a political unsettlement can be sustained in a non-violent 
way, through continuing debate and wrangling, Somalia will manage. In this context, a marketized 
political system in which politics is subject to material incentives structured by the laws of supply 
and demand, is preferable to one in which violence alone determines political outcomes. The current 
electoral cycle shows that Somali elites understand this well: managing the political unsettlement 
with limited violence is preferred to seeking a new political settlement by violent means. If that 
outcome postpones the consolidation of central power and makes formal institution building more 
difficult, so be it.
173  See Bell and Pospisil 2017.
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